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CLAIMS FOR UNINCURRED RESPONSE
COSTS IN CHAPTER 11
INTRODUCTION
Debtors reorganizing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code or Code)1 who anticipate liability for response
costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 19802 (CERCLA) because of conduct which contrib-
uted to pre-petition3 releases4 of hazardous substances 5 normally attempt
to discharge6 that liability in bankruptcy.7 Increasingly debtors have
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). Chapter 11 concerns the reorganiza-
tion of debtors. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (1988).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)). An entity becomes liable for response costs under CERCLA if it is:
(1) the owner and or operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of,'(3) any person who by con-
tract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged
with a transporter for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or mciner-
ation vessel owned or operated by another entity and containing such hazard-
ous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988).
3. A bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of a petition with the bankruptcy
court. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). For the purposes of this Note, the fundamental difference
between an unsecured claim that arises prior to the filing of the petition, a "pre-petition"
claim, and one that arises subsequent to the filing of the petition, a "post-petition" claim,
is the amount and timing of payment. A post-petition claim which is also an expense of
preserving the debtor's estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 503(B)(1)(A) (1988), is entitled to be paid
in full, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1988), before pre-petition claims are paid. See gen-
erally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). A pre-petition claim, by contrast, is paid on a pro-rata
basis if assets remain after higher priority claims are paid. Id. The environmental claims
discussed in this Note are treated as general unsecured claims.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) (defining a release as "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, dicharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dump-
ing, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of bar-
rels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substances or
pollutant or contaminant).").
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (defining a hazardous substance as a substance
listed under other federal laws such as the Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3001, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921 (1988), and the Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988)); see also id. at
§ 9602(a) (expanding the definition of hazardous substance to include any additional sub-
stances which the Administrator determines may pose a subtantial danger to public
health or the environment if released.).
6. A discharge in bankruptcy essentially extinguishes any claim or debt against the
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sought declaratory judgments establishing that response costs8 incurred
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) while cleaning up re-
leases or threatened releases of hazardous substances caused by the
debtor at sites not owned by the debtor constitute dischargeable claims.9
Generally, the EPA will not know the ultimate costs of cleaning a given
site until the process has been performed." The EPA may not even know
the location of the sites at winch the debtor ultimately may be a poten-
tially responsible party (PRP), let alone the more specific details which
determine cleanup procedures, such as the type of hazardous waste in-
debtor existing at the time of the bankruptcy. A discharge forecloses a creditor's right to
collect its debt from the debtor after the close of the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)
(1988).
7. To curb the increasing contamination of our natural resources, Congress enacted
CERCLA or Superfund, which authorized a five-year, $1.6 billion program to clean up
releases of hazardous substances in abandoned disposal sites. See Knckenberger & Rekar,
Superfund Settlements, Breaking the Logjam, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2384, 2386 (1989).
However, at the end of the five-year period it became apparent that the problems posed
by hazardous waste were more substantial and more pervasive than legislators had antici-
pated. By 1989 1200 sites were listed on the National Priority List (a list created by
CERCLA which ranks the nation's most hazardous waste sites and which was originally
supposed to contain only 400 sites, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982) (language repealed 1986)).
The EPA anticipated the addition of hundreds or even thousands more. See Lori Jonas,
Note, Dividing the Toxic Pie: Why Superfund Contingent Contribution Claims Should Not
Be Barred By The Bankruptcy Code, 66 N.Y.U.L. REv. 850 n.7 (1991). To combat this
burgeoning problem, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), extending the life of the program by five years and allocating to the fund an $8.5
billion budget. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which bears the primary
responsibility for enforcing CERCLA and overseeing or conducting cleanups of hazard-
ous sites, 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988) (listing agencies authorized to enforce Superfund), has
a number of enforcement options open to it. It may clean the site with Superfund money
and then sue the polluters, or potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for reimbursement
under section 9607. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1988). The EPA may also order the PRPs
to remedy the site with their own resources- or it may seek injunctive relief against the
PRP in a United States district court. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Any PRP found re-
sponsible for a release or threatenened release of any hazardous substance is liable for the
technical and adminstrative costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning the site. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(b) (1988).
As will be discussed later, CERCLA imposes strict liability upon a broad category of
PRPs. See infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text. The average cost of cleanup at a
moderately sized site has been estimated between $21 million and $30 million. See Krick-
enberger & Rekar, supra, at 2386. It is not surprising that debtors attempt to escape these
costs through bankruptcy.
8. The term "response costs" means the costs associated with a removal or remedial
action. It is not defined in CERCLA, however, its meaning may be derived from the
definitions of "remove or removal," "remedy or remedial" and "respond or response."
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23), 9601(24), 9601(25). See also Amy B. Blumberg, Note, Medi-
cal Monitonng Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in
Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 676 (1992).
9. See infra notes 23-69 and accompanying text.
10. Id. See also Jonas, supra note 7, at 882-83 (describing how the investigation and
cleanup of sites can take years).
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volved and the geological character of the site. u" To combat the per-
ceived mequity of letting debtors discharge CERCLA response costs
before the EPA is even aware that such costs may be appropriate, some
courts have phrased the dischargeability of response costs in terms of
their foreseeability to the agency. 2
Specifically, these courts hold that only response costs foreseeable to
the EPA at the time of the bankruptcy are dischargeable.1 3 Theoretically,
this approach balances the policies of the Bankruptcy Code and CER-
CLA by preventing a debtor from shifting the financial burden of clean-
mg up contamination to taxpayers or other PRPs while preserving the
debtor's fresh start to the broadest extent possible.14 However, the legiti-
macy of the foreseeability standard with respect to the Bankruptcy Code
is questionable because it is not mandated by the Code and because it
frustrates primary policies behind the Code, such as the debtor's entitle-
ment to a fresh start and the concept of equality among creditors with
identical legal rights. 5 Its usefulness in furthering CERCLA's goals is
also doubtful because it fails to resolve the procedural conflict between
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code.16
Part I of this Note explores the legitimacy and utility of the foresee-
ability requirement as a means of balancing the objectives of the statutes.
Part II details the way in which bankruptcy processes conflict with CER-
CLA's jurisdictional bar. Part III concludes that a legislative solution is
necessary to resolve the procedural conflicts between CERCLA and the
11. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); In re National
Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
12. See, e-g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that where potential claimant knows that known release of haz-
ardous substance will lead to CERCLA response costs, and has conducted tests with
regard to contamination problem, dischargeable, contingent CERCLA claim exists); In
re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005 (relationship between EPA and debtor created a
relationship which should provide EPA with awareness of the existence of debtor's poten-
tial response cost obligations sufficient to make them dischargeable contingent claims); In
re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 409 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (all future response costs
based on pre-petition conduct of the debtor capable of being "fairly contemplated" by the
parties at time of bankruptcy are claims); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington North-
ern R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D. Minn. 1991) (debtor could not discharge CERCLA
liability when EPA did not have actual notice of the potential claim in time to file proof
of claim); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 838 (D. Minn. 1990)
(release of hazardous substances does not give rise to a dischargeable claim where EPA
had no notice of relationship between the debtor and the property at the time of the
bankruptcy). See also Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bank-
ruptcy: When Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 327, 354-62 (1991) (arguing that
courts faced with determining the dischargeability of CERCLA liability during a bank-
ruptcy or upon detection of the pollution years after the close of the case should apply a
foreseeability standard and discharge only the CERCLA liability that is or was foresee-
able at the conclusion of the bankruptcy case).
13. See generally infra notes 23-69 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Chicago, 974 F.2d at 779-787; Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407-08.
15. See generally nfra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
16. See generally infra part II.
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Bankruptcy Code, and thus, to successfully balance the statutes' compet-
ing objectives.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT CLAIMS BE
FORESEEABLE IN ORDER TO BE COGNIZABLE IN
BANKRUPTCY
Almost every case that has addressed CERCLA claims in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding has noted that the goals and timing of the statute are
almost diametrically opposed.17 CERCLA provides for the investigation
and clean up of toxic sites, assigns liability to any person connected to
the creation of the hazardous waste problem, and distributes the attend-
ant costs among the relevant parties."8 Conversely, the Bankruptcy Code
enables debtors to jettison most liabilities and affords equal treatment to
unsecured creditors. CERCLA, in the interest of rapid cleanup, enables
the EPA to postpone litigation regarding response costs until after the
completion of the cleanup; determination of liability and distribution of
costs to the relevant PRPs generally does not occur until after comple-
tion of the cleanup.19 In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code envisions a pro-
cess of early identification and discharge of all pre-petition liabilities.20
These variations in the timing and treatment of clais have led to con-
siderable confusion in the case law 21
A. The Environmental Cases
To date, the EPA has challenged debtors' attempts to discharge liabil-
ity for environmental response costs in a variety of situations.22 The fol-
lowing discussion centers primarily on the circuit courts' differing
responses to such challenges.
1. In re Chateaugay Corp.
In In re Chateaugay Corp.,23 the EPA brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment regarding the dischargeability of environmental re-
17. See, e.g., In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 404 (N.D. Tex. 1992). See
also Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA
Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1502 (1989).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1040-41 (2d Cir. 1985).
19. See In re Combustion Equipment Associates, Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988);
In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 404 (N.D. Tex. 1992). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h) (1988).
20. See In re Combustion Equipment Associates, Inc., 838 F.2d at 37.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th
Cir. 1992); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1991); Matter of Penn Central
Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397
(N.D. Tex. 1992); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 133 B.R. 648
(D. Minn. 1991); In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Union
Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
23. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
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sponse costs under CERCLA in the Chapter 11 reorgamzation of the
LTV Corporation and its related companies (LTV).24 LTV, a diversified
steel, energy and aerospace corporation with operations in several states,
filed for protection under Chapter 11.25 It listed among its schedule of
liabilities twenty four pages of "contingent" claims held by the EPA and
the environmental enforcement officers of every state and the District of
Columbia, without listing any information regarding these claims.26 The
EPA filed a proof of claim for $32 million in response costs incurred at
fourteen sites where it had identified LTV as a PRP.27 Only one site had
been improved to the point where no further response costs were antici-
pated. The EPA asserted that LTV might ultimately be found liable as a
PRP at many more sites than those listed, whose locations were still un-
known to the EPA.2" Consequently, the original $32 million claim might
prove to be but a small part of the total CERCLA liability that the EPA
ultimately could assert against LTV 29 Largely because of this uncer-
tainty, the EPA argued that a bankruptcy claim for CERCLA response
costs did not enst until after the government had expended money to
clean up the site. 30 Therefore, the EPA sought a determination that re-
sponse costs yet to be incurred in remedying pre-petition releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances for wich LTV was liable
were not dischargeable.
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the unincurred response
costs were contingent claims for the purposes of bankruptcy, even with
respect to sites unknown to the EPA.31 As a regulatory agency, once the
EPA became aware of LTV's potential liability at one site, they could
then anticipate that LTV might be liable elsewhere.32 Given such foresee-
ability, the location of unknown sites, together with their respective re-
quired investigation and remediation, were merely factors which made
the EPA's claim contingent.33
The breadth of response costs which the Chateaugay court was willing
to recogmze as dischargeable has been questioned by the Seventh Circuit
24. Id. at 999.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999.
30. Id. at 1005. Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a claim in terms of a
"right to payment" whether or not such right is contingent, unmatured or unliquidated.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. III 1991).
31. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
32. Id.
33. Id. What the Second Circuit gave in Chateaugay, it also took away by holding
that if the EPA incurred response costs post-petition, its claim for those costs would be
allowed as administrative claims. Id. at 1009-10. As such, they are entitled to admimstra-
tive priority. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988). Under Chapter 11 there must be provision for
payment in full of such claims if a reorganization plan is to be confirmed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(9).
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m Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 4 and by
the district court for the Northern District of Texas in In re National
Gypsum Co.3 Both courts limited the dischargeability of unmcurred re-
sponse costs in bankruptcy to costs incurred at sites where the EPA had
conducted testing or other investigation. 6
2. Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rail Road Co.
Although the environmental agency suing for response costs did so
post-bankruptcy, and thus was in a different procedural posture with re-
spect to the bankruptcy case, the issues that the Seventh Circuit faced in
Chicago were not significantly different from those addressed by the Sec-
ond Circuit. Specifically, the court had to determine whether environ-
mental response costs constituted claims winch were discharged in the
debtor's bankruptcy.
In Chicago, the debtor, Milwaukee Road, filed for reorganization in
bankruptcy under section 77 of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 on
December 19, 1977. 37 The court ordered that all post-petition claims be
filed by September 10, 1985 or be barred. On November 12, 1985 the
court entered a consummation order wluch became effective on Novem-
ber 25 of that year.38 In 1984 the Washington State Department of
Transportation (WSDOT) bought property from Milwaukee Road that
had been contannated by a derailment m 1979. The Washington State
Department of Ecology (WSDOE) was aware of the contamination by
June or July of 1985 when it took soil samples at the site and did a bioas-
say on those samples. 9 In August of 1985, before the bar date had
passed, WSDOE notified WSDOT that the site was contaminated and
would have to be cleaned up, requiring treatment, removal and storage of
waste.' Despite this knowledge, neither WSDOT nor the State of Wash-
ington took any action until 1989, when WSDOT filed a complaint
against the successor to Milwaukee Road, CMC Heartland Partners
(CMC). CMC sought an injunction in the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois on the grounds that its liability for response costs had
been discharged in the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy. The district court
granted the injunction, holding that the State's claim for cleanup costs
was dischargeable, and thus had been discharged. It ruled that notice
given to the Washington State Department of Revenue about the bank-
ruptcy was sufficient to notify the true party in interest, Washington
State.4 Thus, the consummation order barred the State of Washington's
34. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
35. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
36. See infra notes 43-47 and 61-65 and accompanying text.
37. Chicago, 974 F.2d at 777.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 778.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 779.
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claims.42
The court's rationale for this holding was that:
when a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to
a known release of a hazardous substance which this potential claim-
ant knows will lead to CERCLA response costs, and when this poten-
tial claimant has, in fact, conducted tests with regard to tis
contamination problem, then tis potential claimant has, at least, a
contingent CERCLA claim for the purposes of Section 77 43
In its analysis the court disagreed with In re Chateaugay Corp.' and In
re Jensen,45 both of which had held that a claim arises on the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance, without more. The Seventh
Circuit was concerned that such a broad interpretation of when a clain
arises could render claims dischargeable although the relevant creditors
had no reason to know of the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance.46 The court similarly declined to accept the rationale adopted
in United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal.47 The Union Scrap court
ruled that a CERCLA claim dischargeable in bankruptcy did not arise
until the environmental agency incurs response costs. 48 Endorsement of
such an analysis, according to the Chicago court, risked encouraging a
CERCLA creditor to delay response costs until after the close of the
bankruptcy. This would frustrate the Bankruptcy Code's dual policies of
giving a fresh start to debtors and treating all creditors with similar legal
rights equally. It would also frustrate CERCLA's policy of encouraging
the fastest possible cleanup.49
3. In re National Gypsum Co.
In In re National Gypsum Co., ° the debtor sought a determination
that claims for response costs ultimately arising out of pre-petition re-
leases at several sites were dischargeable."i The costs resulted from pre-
42. Chicago, 974 F.2d at 788.
43. Id. at 784.
44. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
45. 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
46. Chicago, 974 F.2d at 786.
47. 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
48. It is worth noting that the Union Scrap court later appeared to retreat from this
analysis. In Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D.
Minn. 1991), the court shifted its emphasis from whether response costs had yet been
incurred to whether the creditor knew of the existence of its claim before the close of the
bankruptcy. The court distinguished its holding from both In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), and the district court opinion in In re Chateaugay Corp., 112
B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), with respect to its procedural posture. Specifically, the court
indicated that where the opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy is no longer avail-
able, the policy analysis changes. The court implied that this change is a shift in preemi-
nence from the debtor's traditional right to a fresh start to the creditor's right to have
notice of the existence of a potentially dischargeable claim in time to file a proof of claim.
49. Chicago, 974 F.2d at 786.
50. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
51. Id. at 400-01.
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petition releases at three categories of sites: (1) seven "listed" sites, sites
identifed on EPA's National Priority List (NPL)5 2 and in the EPA's
proof of claim; (2) thirteen "unlisted" sites, places not identified on the
EPA's National Priority List" or in the EPA's proof of claim; and (3)
numerous other sites to which the EPA believed the debtor was linked
based on information in its computer databases.54 Some form of govern-
mental remedial action had been taken at the seven sites listed in the
proof of claim: either the sites had been listed on the NPL,55 the govern-
ment had notified the debtors of their PRP status, the government had
conducted remedial investigation/feasibility studies (RI/FS),56 the gov-
ernment had produced a record of decision (ROD),57 the government
had issued an Admimstrative Consent Order,58 or the government had
incurred response costs.59 At these sites the EPA had conducted suffi-
cient investigation to allege that the debtor had arranged for disposal of
its wastes.6°
Using the Second Circuit's Chateaugay opinion as a guide for its analy-
sis, the Gypsum court was particularly troubled by the fact that the
Chateaugay court's broad definition of claim "encompass[ed] costs that
could not 'fairly' have been contemplated by the EPA or the debtor pre-
petition,, 61 because they had not been discovered by the EPA or by any-
one else.62 The court noted that Chateaugay based its determination of
when a claim arises for the purpose of bankruptcy on the debtor's pre-
petition conduct, rather than on the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance. However, the court found no "meaningful distmc-
tion between the debtor's conduct and the release or threatened release
resulting from this conduct," since the recogition of either circumstance
depended upon its fortuitous discovery.63 The court held that future re-
sponse costs based on pre-petition conduct which could be fairly contem-
52. The NPL prioritizes releases or threatened releases nationwide m order to facili-
tate remedial action. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A)-(B) (1988). The criteria structuring
these priorities are statutorily set and include the population placed at risk, the hazard
potential of the substances, the potential of contaminating water and air, the potential for
destruction of ecosystems, and other factors. Listing on the NPL requires a preliminary
finding by the EPA that there exists at the site a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(a)(8)(A)-(B), 9604(a)(1) (1988).
53. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 398-401.
54. Id. at 403.
55. Id.
56. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 402.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 407 (quoting Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005).
62. Id.
63. Id. The court noted that it is the Fifth Circuit's position that disposal of a hazard-
ous substance in itself constitutes a release or threatened release. See id. at 407 n. 25
(citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989). CERCLA itself
defines a release as, among other things, the "dumping, or disposing into the environment
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed recep-
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plated by the parties at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy were claims
under the Code." The court proposed consideration of the following fac-
tors to identify claims that could have been "fairly" contemplated by the
parties: "knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable,
NPL listing, notification by EPA of PRP liability, commencement of in-
vestigation and cleanup activities, and incurrence of response costs."65
However, the court noted that the government need not have full infor-
mation as to the debtor's existing or potential liability for future response
costs m order to include unliquidated or contingent claims in its proof of
claim." In conclusion, the court warned that it would not tolerate dila-
tory tactics by the EPA in order to preserve known dischargeable claims
to assert post-bankruptcy.67
In each of these instances, the court held that response costs arising
out of pre-petition releases or threatened releases of hazardous materials
by the debtor were contingent claims under the Bankruptcy Code. How-
ever, the courts also attempted to condition discharge upon the informa-
tion possessed by the creditor about that claim. In creating this standard
the courts were influenced by a need to balance CERCLA's mandate that
PRPs should finance the clean up of toxic sites with the Code's policy
that all of the debtor's obligations should be resolved and discharged.
However, this compromise is neither sanctioned by the Bankruptcy
Code68 nor useful in furthering CERCLA's goals.69
B. Background: Congressional Intent
Understanding the approaches of the Second and Seventh Circuits and
the district court requires review of the Code and its definition of what
constitutes a contingent claim cogizable in bankruptcy. Case after case
has held that Congress intended that courts interpret the defintion of
claim 7° broadly 71 The ambiguities inherent in the statute have ensured,
tacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22) (1988).
64. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 409.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 409.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 70-141 and accompanying text.
69. See generally nfra parts ID and II.
70. The Code defines the term "claim" to mean a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable rem-
edy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
71. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991); Pennsylvania Dep't of
Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). The CRIMINAL VICTIMS PROTECTION
ACT OF 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865 (1990), substantially overruled the
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however, that no court has yet authoritatively defined the parameters for
interpreting this provision, i.e., what constitutes a claim in bankruptcy
and when it arises. As drafted and understood by Congress, the provision
unquestionably anticipates that the bankruptcy process concerns the col-
lection and discharge of as many of the claims outstanding against the
debtor as possible in the bankruptcy proceeding.72 Through the breadth
of the defimtion, Congress hoped to implement certain policies, primarily
that the debtor should receive a fresh start and that all similarly situated
creditors be treated equally in the bankruptcy " On one hand, the Code
allows debtors to reenter their businesses without being shadowed by
debt.74 Through this fresh start it seeks to prevent the liquidation of the
debtor's business and thus the attendant unemployment of workers and
the inefficient utilization of economic resources.75 On the other hand, the
Code treats all similarly situated creditors76 identically, no matter when
the debtor's obligation to repay them arises,77 so that the debtor's assets
Supreme Court's holding here. Nevertheless, as the Court noted m Johnson, the Act did
not disturb the Court's general conclusions with respect to the breadth of the Code. See
Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2154 n.4; see also Oio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); Robinson v.
McGuigan, 776 F.2d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 693 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprnted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6266 ("By
this broadest possible definition the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bank-
ruptcy case."); S. REP'. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785, 5807-08.
72. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 782
(7th Cir. 1992) ("Considering that a bankruptcy court can more equitably distribute
property and assure the debtor a fresh start if all claims are before it, considering that
little benefit will be gained by allowing a person who knows it has a claim to pursue the
claim outside of bankruptcy or to sit on the claim until after the bankruptcy, and consid-
ering that granting a priority classification as an administrative expense to any such debts
would impinge on the bankruptcy court's ability to equitably distribute limited funds
among numerous creditors, it is not surprising that several courts in this posture have
held that the claim arose for purposes of bankruptcy at the earliest point possible. ");
see also Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1988). In devel-
oping a definition for a claim cogmzable in bankruptcy to be applied by the new Bank-
ruptcy Code, Congress took its cue from the reorganization chapters of the former
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act].
Thus Congress effected its ultimate goal of giving debtors a fresh start by freeing them
from all obligations. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprnted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08.
73. See In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 318, 923-34 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
74. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
75. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. 760, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)).
76. "Similarly situated creditors" means all creditors with identical legal rights
against the debtor. For example, creditors with identical legal rights against the debtor
would be all secured creditors or all unsecured creditors, etc. See Mark J. Roe, Bank-
ruptcy And Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv 846, 851-52 (1984).
77. See id. at 853. This principle is known as temporal equality. Once a creditor has a
right to payment from the debtor that arises prepetition, either under an agreement or as
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may be equitably distributed among them.78
Judicial definitions of a dischargeable claim and when it arises, when
not explicitly covered in the Code, must comply not only with the letter
of the Code, but also with the policies embodied in its provisions. Efforts
to effect these policies, however, have led many courts to find that a right
to payment cognizable as a claim for bankruptcy purposes arises upon
conduct by the debtor giving rise to a "right of action. '79 The problem
with this interpretation is that the condition or event giving rise to liabil-
ity may not manifest itself until post-petition or even post-bankruptcy,
and thus it countenances the existence of dischargeable claims about
which neither the debtor nor the creditor may know anything.80
In its redefinition of "claim," Congress expanded the range of creditors
eligible to participate in the bankruptcy It eliminated the necessity that a
claim be "provable" in order to be allowable. 1 The Bankruptcy Act had
defined provable claims as debts which were "a fixed liability, as evi-
denced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at
the time of the filing of the petition .". ,82 Thus, parties with claims that
did not fit this narrow construction, such as tort claimants with injuries
that did not manifest themselves pre-petition, had held non-provable
rights, and had been excluded from sharing in the distribution of the
debtor's assets.83 While these parties could have brought their claims
a result of a tortious act, it has a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy no matter when the
debtor must deliver payment. That the contract may not mature, or a judgment in a tort
case may not be rendered, until after the petition, or even after the bankruptcy, does not
affect the creditor's right to participate in the distribution of assets. Id.
78. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. 335, 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). The
emphasis upon equitable distribution is embodied in the provision in section 362 which
automatically stays all actions against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). The provision
seeks to prevent the "race to the courthouse" that would result from all creditors trying
to secure a remedy from the debtor before its assets ran out. As stated in the legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
The automatic stay provides creditor protection. Without it, certain credi-
tors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property.
Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and
to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an or-
derly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A
race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that.
S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5835.
79. A right of action is a liability which could, at some future point, give rise to a
cause of action. See, eg., In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 32 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). This
interpretation is substantially similar to the second most popular interpretation, that a
claim arises at the earliest possible moment in the relationship between the debtor and the
creditor. See In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). Jensen approvingly
noted the similarity of this interpretation to the one upon which it based its opinion.
Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31-32.
80. See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text.
81. See Saville, supra note 12 at 334-35.
82. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976).
83. See Saville, supra note 12 at 334-35.
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against the debtor post-bankruptcy, 4 frequently there was nothing left to
sue save an empty shell without assets.8 5 Therefore, inclusion of contin-
gent obligations in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrated
that Congress intended the courts to recognize potential claims where no
fixed liability yet existed as present realities to be addressed and dis-
charged in the bankruptcy case.
The concept of the contingent claim, or contingent liability, appears in
a number of places in the Bankruptcy Code, but nowhere is it defined. 6
Its inclusion in the definition of claim reflects Congress' desire to enable
the Code to bring as many of the debtor's obligations as possible before
the court.7 However, no Code provision requires that a contingent claim
be foreseeable, or that a creditor must have notice or actual knowledge of
a contingent claim, for it to exist. 88
Most sections of the Code that address the treatment of a contingent
claim in bankruptcy presume that the creditor is aware of its existence.
For example, section 502(c)(1) provides that courts shall estimate contin-
gent claims for the purpose of allowing them in the bankruptcy, which
presumes that such claims have been scheduled by the debtor or filed by
a creditor.8 9 Additionally, section 303(b)(1) prevents a creditor with a
claim that is contingent as to liability from pushing a debtor into invol-
untary bankruptcy 90 However, holders of unmatured or unliquidated
claims are not similarly barred. Rather, the debtor must have a concrete
84. See Bankrutpcy Act § 17(a), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) (discharge released debtor
only from provable debts).
85. Timothy B. Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 221, 224 (1983).
86. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 303(b), 502, 1111 (1988).
87. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-5808. The Senate report states that:
The effect of the [new] definition is a significant departure from present law.
Under present law, "claim" is not defined in straight bankruptcy. Instead it is
simply used, along with the concept of provability [under the old Bankruptcy
Act, claims were not allowable unless they were provable] in section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act, to limit the kinds of obligations that are payable in a bank-
ruptcy case. The term is defined in the debtor rehabilitation chapters of present
law far more broadly. The definition m paragraph (4) [redesignated in 1990 as
(5)] adopts an even broader definition of claim than is found m the present
debtor rehabilitation chapters By this broadest possible definition the
bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote
or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the
broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1988). The statute reads: "There shall be estimated for
purpose of allowance under this section - (1) any contingent or unliqudated claim, the
fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration
of the case "Id. See infra notes 192-214 and accompanying text for details of
estimation.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "(b) An invol-
untary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title - (1) by three or more entities, each of which
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obligation to pay the creditor which will definitely accrue at some future
point, not merely the possibility that he might become liable to the credi-
tor upon the happening of some future event. Finally, section 1129(a)(1 1)
provides that the court must establish that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is
not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further finan-
cial reorgamzation, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor" before
confirming the plan.91 This provision prevents confirmation of "vision-
ary" plans which promise creditors and equity holders more than the
debtor can possibly achieve after confirmation.92 The court cannot ap-
prove a plan as feasible if significant contingent claims remain to be esti-
mated and accounted for m the plan.93 Thus, the provision anticipates
the parties' and the court's awareness of the existence of contingent
claims.
Although some party must have knowledge of the existence of the con-
tingent claim in order for it to be included in the bankruptcy, such
awareness is not explicitly necessary for a non-individual debtor's dis-
charge. Under section 1141(d), confirmation of a reorganization plan dis-
charges the debtor from all dischargeable pre-petition debts whether or
not a proof of claim was filed, whether or not an estimated claim was
allowed, and whether or not the claim holder accepted the plan.94 Under
section 727(b), an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 case is discharged
from all dischargeable pre-petition debts and estimated liabilities regard-
less of whether a proof of claim has been filed, and, if such proof of claim
was filed, regardless of whether the claim was allowed.95 Section
is either a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the
subject of a bona fide dispute "Id.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
92. See In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 5
Collier on Bankruptcy 1129.02[2] at 1129-21 and 1129-22 (Lawrence P King et al. eds.,
15th ed. 1993).
93. In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d at 1382.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(1988). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided m this subsection, in the plan, or m the order
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan - (A) discharges the debtor
from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation, and any debt of a
kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title, whether or not -
(i) a proof of claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section 501
of this title; (ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or (iii) the
holder of such claim has accepted the plan
Id. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 418-19 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5693; S. RP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1978), repnnted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5915-16.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988). The statute reads:
Except as provided m section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a)
of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of
the order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is deter-
mined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the com-
mencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on any such debt
or liability is filed under section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim
based on any such debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this title.
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523(a)(3)(A) does prevent individual debtors from discharging a claim
known to them during the bankruptcy. The debtor must have failed to
adequately notify the creditor of its existence, and the creditor must not
have had notice or actual knowledge of the case m time to have properly
fied a proof of claim.96 However, there is no similar provision requiring
that the creditor of a corporate debtor have knowledge of the existence of
its contingent claim in order for that claim to be discharged. Thus, in the
name of the debtor's "fresh start," it appears that the language of the
Code permits a creditor's interests to be discharged in this situation, re-
gardless of whether the creditor received notice or the debtor made any
effort to notify the creditor. 97
C. Judicial Constructions of Congressional Intent Regarding
Contingent Claims
Understanding the application of a foreseeability requirement in the
environmental cases as a criterion defining a dischargeable claim m bank-
ruptcy also requires some investigation of its application in the judicial
interpretation of contingent claims.
1. Notice
It should be elementary that creditors have a due process right to no-
tice of the bankruptcy prior to the discharge of their claims. The
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 9s has
suggested that discharge of a claim without notice to the claim holder
violates due process. 99 In Mullane, a bank had appointed a guardian for
all absent persons, known or unknown, who may have had an interest in
the income of a trust fund. 10 In an accounting action, the bank sought to
notify all beneficiaries by publication. 101 In evaluating the adequacy of
notice by publication to absent beneficiaries, the Court balanced the
Id.
The Code prevents non-individual debtors from discharging liability in a liquidating
Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7, presumably because there is no entity left after the bank-
ruptcy that needs relief from pre-petition debts. See §§ 727(a)(1), 1141(d)(3)(A)-(C)
(1988).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (1988). The statute reads:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt - (3) neither listed nor
scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to the
debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit - (A) if
such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4) or (6) of this subsection,
timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing
Id.
97. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1141.01[4] at 1141-13 to 1141-17 (Lawrence
P King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993).
98. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
99. Id. at 313-15.
100. Id. at 310.
101. Id.
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State's interest in a final settlement of the claims against the individuals'
interest in notification.10 2 The Court commented that notice obligations
should not be so burdensome as to defeat the State's objectives,10 3 how-
ever they should be "reasonably calculated. . to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." 1" Thus, notice by publication was inadequate
when the State could have notified the individuals personally 105 If, how-
ever, individual notice is impossible under the circumstances, the court
would accept the selected form of notice if it is as likely to notify the
missing or unknown persons as any other form.106 Under such circum-
stances, notice would be satisfied by indirect or even futile forms of no-
tice. 107 The Court acknowledged that directly notifying individuals
whose interests were future or conjectural could be so problematic and
costly that it would constitute an unreasonable burden.108 In conclusion,
the Court held that notification of future or conjectural beneficiaries by
publication fulfilled due process.10 9
Similarly, in City of New York v. New York New Haven & Hartford
R.R.,110 the Supreme Court addressed the effect of reorganization under
section 77, the discharge provision of the former Bankruptcy Act, on
liens held by New York City on the debtor's real estate. While the debtor
had published the bar order in a newspaper, it also sent out copies of the
bar order directing creditors to file their claims. 11 The City failed to file
its lien claims. The Court held that although New York City was a credi-
tor within the definition of the Bankruptcy Act, notice by publication of
the bar order was insufficient when the debtor knew of the City's claims
during the bankruptcy. 2 Justice Black noted:
even creditors who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to
assume that the statutory 'reasonable notice' will be given them before
their claims are forever barred The statutory command for notice
embodies a basic principle of justice - that a reasonable opportunity
to be heard must precede judicial denial of a party's claimed nghts.1 13
Although there is no statutory protection of creditors' right to notice of
the existence of a claim under the Code, due process considerations
would appear to protect creditors' rights and would require a court to
102. Id. at 313-14.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 314.
105. Mullane, 309 U.S. at 318-19.
106. Id. at 315.
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 344 U.S. 293 (1953). This case was superseded by statute to the extent that the
Code made proper period for notice of bar date discretionary with the judge. See In re
Rockmacher, 125 B.R. 380, 384 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
111. Id. at 294.
112. Id. at 296.
113. Id. at 297.
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find that a clain could not be discharged without notice of the bank-
ruptcy to the creditor.
114
The majority of cases addressing contingent claims have dealt with
ascertainable parties who could foresee the existence of their claims. 1 5
Thus, their analysis usually has failed to address whether or not notice or
foreseeability is essential to the existence of a contingent claim.
2. The All Media Definition
The concept of a "contingent" claim has been most persuasively de-
fined by the court in In re All Media Properties, Inc..116 That case ad-
dressed the meamng of a contingent claim within the context of section
303(b)(1), the section defining the type of creditor entitled to push a
debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. 1 7 The All Media court noted that
although section 303(b)(1) barred holders of contingent claims from
bringing an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, it implicitly permitted
creditors holding claims that were uniatured or unliquidated to bring
such a petition. 18 Thus, a claim where the amount of liability either had
not become due or had not been determined was not contingent as to
liability."1 9 The court held that "a claim is contingent as to liability if the
debtor's legal duty to pay does not come into existence until triggered by
the occurrence of a future event and such future occurrence was within
the actual or presumed contemplation of the parties at the time the ongi-
nal relationship of the parties was created." 120
The widely accepted All Media definmtion of a contingent claim
presumes that contingent liability is foreseeable to the parties. Clearly, in
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(3), 727(b), 1141(d) (1988). Section 523(a)(3) of the Code
specifically bars individuals from discharging debts to creditors without their notice or
actual knowledge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). Notice or knowledge must be actual, not
constructive, unless notice is provided to the creditor's agent. However, it may be re-
ceived from any source. Notice to the agent must take place while the agent is acting
within the scope of his authority, and Ins authority includes enforcement of the claim. 3
COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 523.04[2] at 523-20 (Lawrence P King et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1992). See, e.g., In the Matter of Compton, 891 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1990) (claim
dischargeable if the creditor had actual knowledge or notice); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982). But see United States Small Business Administra-
tion v. Bridges, 894 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1990) (a debtor must take seriously its obligation
to schedule all creditors, for the court will not interpret the notice exceptions to the
scheduling requirements so broadly that an unlisted creditor's rights are compromised).
See also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1141.01[6] at 1141-13 to 1141-17 (Lawrence P
King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993) (debtor may not be able to discharge claim if it failed to
notify creditor of which it was aware during bankruptcy). If the creditor is notified, but
not in time to file a proof of claim, a court may still find that he or she received insuffi-
cient notice. See Laczko v. Gentran, Inc. (In re Laczko) 37 B.R. 676 (Bankr. Anz. 1984),
aff'd, 772 F.2d 912 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985).
115. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
116. 5 B.R. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). See supra note 90.
118. All Media, 5 B.R. at 132.
119. Id. at 133.
120. Id.
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the case of a contract obligation, the existence of contingent liability is
foreseeable by the parties at the time they draft the agreement. 21 How-
ever, in the case of a tort claim for negligence, the parties could have
foreseen the alleged tortfeasor's liability only if the tort victim/creditor
recogized that he had been injured at the time of the negligent act. The
tort claim is contingent not only upon a judicial award to fix liability and
amount, 122 but also upon the victim's awareness of the injury.
3. Unmanifested Tort Claims: Expanding the Scope of the
Contingent Claim Cognizable in Bankruptcy
Courts have sought ways to implement Congress' policy of including
and discharging as many contingent claims as possible through bank-
ruptcy, whether or not the claims were foreseeable, to improve the equal-
ity of distribution among creditors and to effectuate a fresh start.123
However, admitting claims into the bankruptcy before clannholders
know of their existence risks discharging liabilities that cannot exist until
years after the bankruptcy, such as in a products liability case, where the
defective product mjures an individual years after the bankruptcy of the
manufacturer.124 Discharging the clains of such a tort claimant without
notice would appear to violate due process. To avoid this problem, the
121. In a contract the right to payment exists when the agreement is made; its breach
is the contingent act triggering liability. See In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986). For example, "in the case of the classic contingent liability of a guarantor of
a promissory note executed by a third party, both the creditor and guarantor [know]
there [will] be liability only if the principal maker [defaults]. No obligation arises until
such default." All Media, 5 B.R. at 133.
122. See In re Blehm, 33 B.R. 678, 680 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). Note that the courts
have refused to recognize any distinction between contingency as to liability and contin-
gency as to amount. See Matter of Ford, 967 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992).
123. See supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991); In re UNR
Industries, Inc., 29 B.R. 741, 746 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1983).
Whether or not a prospective claumholder will be able to foresee the existence of his or
her claim depends upon when the claim arises under bankruptcy law. Case law manifests
competing concepts of when a claim arises for the purpose of bankruptcy. While the
timing of when a claim arises for the purpose of bankruptcy remains undetermined, a
significant number of courts find that a clain arises upon the debtor's conduct giving rise
to liability in order to include more creditors m the distribution of assets and to provide
the debtor with a fresh start. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 32 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1991) (claim arises at time when acts giving rise to liability were performed); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (contingent claim must result
from pre-petition conduct fairly giving rise to the claim), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d
Cir. 1991); In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (claim arose
at the time Dalkon Shield was inserted into claimant), aff'd, Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.,
839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Johns Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in determining when liability arose, focus should be on when the acts
giving rise to the alleged liability were performed). Cf In re Edge, 60 B.R. at 701. The
Edge court stated that a claim arose at the "earliest point in the relationship between
victim and wrongdoer," id. at 699, later identifying this point as the moment when the
tortious act occurred. Id. This suggests that the "relationship" approach is merely an-
other way to date liability from the debtor's conduct creating the liability. But see, e.g.,
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.) (existence of a contin-
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courts have recharacterized these contingent claims as "interests" While
they have not held that future tort claimants in mass tort cases possess
dischargeable claims, they have acknowledged that unforeseen claimants
may possess a significant interest in the debtor's estate, which deserves
consideration in the bankruptcy. 125 While courts have noted the consid-
erable problem of providing all possible claimants with proper notice,
26
none as yet have articulated any specific balancing test for evaluating
when, if ever, a claim may be discharged without notice.
a. In re Johns Manville Corp.
In In re Johns Manville Corp.,127 the bankruptcy court addressed
whether it could appoint a representative for future tort claimants in-
jured by Manville's asbestos products. It found that unforeseeable plain-
tiffs were interested parties to the bankruptcy128 under section
1109(b),129 and thus were entitled to representation.130 The court de-
clined to address whether those interests were dischargeable claims,1
3 1
because the reorganization plan treated future claims as non-dischargea-
ble.132 To reach this result the court focused on the impact of determm-
mg the rights of parties absent from the case and ignorant of its
ramifications.1 33 The court balanced Congress' intention that bankruptcy
gent claim is premised on the existence of a legal relationship relevant to the purported
interest from which that interest flows), cert denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
Most of the environmental cases discussed m this note determined the classification of
the EPA's claim as a pre-petition unsecured claim on the timing of the debtor's conduct.
See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rail Road Co., 974 F.2d at 786;
Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005; In re National Gypsum Co. 139 B.R. at 407; Jensen, 127
B.R. at 32. But see In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1991)
(response costs arsing out of pre-petition or pre-consummation activities of debtor not
discharged by bankruptcy because claims based on CERCLA, which was not enacted
until after the consummation order was entered); United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835-36 (D. Minn. 1990) (CERCLA claim did not arise until costs
were incurred).
125. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1035, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (future
claimants are sufficiently affected by the reorganization proceedings to require some voice
m them); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747-53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (fu-
ture tort claimants are parties m interest to the bankruptcy for a variety of reasons).
126. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1984). See gen-
erally Anne Hardiman, Note, Recent Development: Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REv 1369, 1382-89 (1985).
127. 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
128. Id. at 745-47.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988). The section addresses a party's right to be heard and
states: "A party in interest,'including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors comittee, an
equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture
trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chap-
ter." Id.
130. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 757-59.
131. Id. at 754.
132. Id. However, since the plan entitled the claimants to recover their damages from
a pool of assets and limited their recovery to this pool, their future claims were effectively
discharged. Id.
133. See id. at 749-59.
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courts address all of the debtor's obligations in a Chapter 11 case, and
the potential detriment to creditors and parties in interest if these inter-
ests were not included in the proceeding, against the need for notice and
the logic that claims arise upon their discovery by the claimholder.13 ' To
the Manville court, legal authority and logic demanded that claims ac-
crue from the point of discovery rather than exposure, since no plaintiff
could bring a case against a tortfeasor before he or she had manifested
some injury. 135 However, where injuries might not manifest themselves
for years, failing to provide for future claimants in the bankruptcy could
jeopardize their ultimate recovery. Manville might distribute its assets to
the known tort claimants and have little left over with which to pay the
later claims. 136 Manville might even be forced to liquidate and go out of
business, leaving future tort claimants uncompensated. 137 Although pro-
vision of adequate notice to all parties impacted by the proceedings when
neither the claimants themselves nor the debtor were aware of their sta-
tus might be a challenging problem, the court found that it was not an
insurmountable one.138 Therefore, efficient resolution of the interests of
the debtor, trade creditors, and tort creditors, in accordance with the
broad scope of the policies of the Code, warranted recogmtion of future
tort claimants' interests in the bankruptcy, regardless of whether they
themselves knew of those interests.
In reaching its conclusion, the Manville court criticized the analysis of
the district courts in In re UNR Industries, Inc. 139 and In re Amatex
134. See generally Manville, 36 B.R. at 751-59.
135. Id. at 751-52 n.4. The court also noted that m many states, the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run on such a tort claim until discovery. However, to limit the
definition of a claim cognizable m bankruptcy by the differing statutes of limitation in
each state would generate inconsistent results, id., and would allow state law to restrict
the scope of Congress' definition of a claim. Id. at 754 n.6.
136. Id. at 746.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 755 n.6. The court noted that the varieties of electronic media available to
the legal representative of future claimants unproved the likelihood that claimants would
receive reasonable notice. The court also noted that under the case law developed from
the Supreme Court's decision in Mullane the court was to balance the overall interest in
resolution of the case with the individual's interest in adequate protection. Id. at 756 n.6
(citing In re DCA Development Corp., 489 F.2d 43, 46 (lst Cir. 1973)). Where parties
were unknown, constructive or informal notice would suffice if "it is reasonably calcu-
lated under all the circumstances to afford interested parties an opportunity to be heard."
Manville, 36 B.R. at 756 (citing In re GAC Corp., 681 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982)).
139. 29 B.R. 741 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1983). In In re UNR Industries, Inc., District Judge
Hart denied the debtor's request that the court appoint a representative for future tort
claimants. The court stated that tort claims were not contingent claims under the Code.
Id. at 745. Furthermore, future tort claimants without discernable injury had no tort
claims cognizable in bankruptcy, thus their claims did not arise m time to participate in
the case. Id. Additionally, there would be no way to ensure adequate representation. Id.
at 747. (The court noted that in a non-bankruptcy context courts had refused to grant
class certification in mass tort actions because it was impossible to ensure adequate repre-
sentation of disparate interests. In a bankruptcy context, there was no greater assurance
that an appointed representative would be able to represent adequately the interests of
future claimants.) Finally, the variety of ways in which asbestos related injuries could
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Corp."4 Both courts refused to recognize the interests of future tort
claimants m the bankruptcies based on narrow interpretations of Con-
gress' intent under the Code. 141
D. Limiting Dischargeable Claims to Foreseeable Claims Subverts
Bankruptcy Policy
A debtor's liability for CERCLA response costs at sites which the
debtor does not own fits the definition of a dischargeable, contingent
claim as developed by Congress and the courts. 142 The Chicago and Gyp-
sum decisions added a foreseeability standard to prevent the debtor from
discharging responsibility for CERCLA cleanup costs before they could
be assessed m an effort to protect the EPA's right to payment of those
claims. However, such a conclusion begs the question of whether pay-
ment can be secured from another PRP CERCLA holds owners, opera-
tors, transporters and those who arranged for transport of hazardous
occur would defeat all attempts at personal notice. Id. at 747. But see Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 318 (holding that constructive notice is appropriate where the parties are unknown and
personal notice would be burdensome enough to defeat the resolution of the government's
purpose).
In contrast, on appeal the Seventh Circuit in In re UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d
111 1(7th Cir. 1984), commented in dicta that whether or not a plaintiff had a manifested
injury, and thus a cause of action in tort, equitable considerations rmght warrant recogni-
tion of unmanifested claims in bankruptcy. Id. at 1119. First, the date upon which the
tort manifests itself is arbitrary. Id. Thus, similarly situated creditors whose disease was
merely more aggressive would get the first, and perhaps the only, opportunity to collect
from the debtor. Second, the corporation itself might not be able to reorganize success-
fully if future claims are not discharged before they ripen. Id. at 1119-20. If the corpora-
tion were liquidated, present creditors could be damaged, because the liquidation value of
the enterprise might not exceed the going concern value. Id. at 1120. However, the court
was styrmied by the impossible and "quixotic" prospect of providing constitutionally ade-
quate notification to future claimants. Id.
140. 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). The bankruptcy court in In re Amatex Corp.
denied the debtor's request for a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of future tort
claimants. Id. at 315. Based upon the legislative history, the court held that Congress
intended the term "creditor" to mean a holder of prepetition claims against the debtor.
Id. at 314. Since a tort claim does not anse under non-bankruptcy law until the plaintiff
manifests an injury, future tort claimants presented no claim recognized by the Code. Id.
As a plan can affect only prepetition claims or interests, their interests would not be
discharged by confirmation of the reorganization plan. Id. at 315. Therefore, the court
saw no reason to appoint a representative to represent interests unrecognized by the
Code. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that future claimants were parties in interest under
section 1109(b) and were sufficiently affected by the bankruptcy proceedings to warrant
appointment of their own representative. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43
(3d Cir. 1985). It specifically avoided making any determination regarding whether or not
future tort claimants were creditors with claims under the Code. Id. at 1041. However, it
did note that failing to recognize them in the bankruptcy proceeding could jeopardize the
success of the reorganization and could prejudice the position of future claimants. Id. at
1041-42.
141. See generally notes 139-40.
142. See generally supra notes 23-141 and accompanying text.
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waste strictly liable for cleanup costs,143 even if they neither caused nor
contributed to the release of hazardous waste at the site. 1  Most courts
have held that CERCLA imposes joint and several liability upon PRPs,
although this is not explicitly set forth in the statute. 145 This liability runs
with the land; if the debtor owns the site and sells it to another, that
buyer assumes the debtor's liability as owner of the site.' 46 Thus, if the
EPA cannot collect the debtor's share of response costs from the debtor,
it can look to other responsible parties for payment.
Consequently, the debtor's discharge may cause another responsible
party to be held liable for a disproportionate share of the pollution. 47
While section 113(f) of CERCLA allows responsible parties left with the
cleanup bill to sue other responsible parties for contribution,1 48 section
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). An entity becomes liable for response costs under
CERCLA if it is:
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for transport for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and contain-
ing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incinera-
tion vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the mncurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i)-(4) (1988). See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966
F.2d 837, 840 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987); New York
v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
144. See Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 807 F Supp. 1133, 1136
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
145. See United States v. Aceto Agne. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (8th Cir.
1989). See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 732 n.3; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d
at 1052 n.13; United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802, 808-10 (S.D. Ohio
1983). As the Gypsum court recounts, Chem-Dyne was the first court to intro-uce the
joint and several liability standard into the CERCLA liability analysis and subsequent
decisions have accepted this finding. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 414.
146. See In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1992). This
is so unless the owner can assert one of the defenses listed in section 107(b). These allow a
party to escape liability for releases resulting from an act of God, war, or the act or
omission of a third party with whom the party had no prior relationship. In this last
circumstance, the party must prove that she exercised due care in handling the hazardous
substance and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(1)-(4) (1988).
147. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1071 (1990).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). The section provides in pertinent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or po-
tentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil
action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an
action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under 9606 of this title or
section 9607 of this title.
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502(e)(1)(B) disallows contingent claims for contribution from participa-
tion in the bankruptcy.149 In other words, if the responsible party seeking
contribution has not yet liquidated the amount of the cleanup costs either
by performing the cleanup or by paying the EPA, the clain is contingent,
and is therefore disallowed. 5 Since the bankruptcy discharges the
debtor's liability for all debts, whether allowed or disallowed, 15' the
PRP's claim against the debtor is extinguished.' 52 Furthermore, with re-
spect to undiscovered sites, the contribution rights of fellow PRP's
against the debtor-PRP are then terminated by the discharge before any-
one can contemplate the release, let alone the need for contribution.'53
Although Congress added the contribution provision to CERCLA to fa-
cilitate expeditious settlement and cleanup of toxic sites154 by allowing
responsibility for the cleanup costs of a given site to be more equitably
distributed between responsible parties,'55 CERCLA's strict liability
standard places payment above such equitable considerations. Discharg-
ing contingent claims in bankruptcy thwarts the equitable distribution of
the costs, but not necessarily the payment of those costs. While Congress
should remedy this conflict so that costs may be distributed equitably, as
CERCLA intends, judicial resolution of this problem through the fore-
seeability requirement is inappropriate.
If, however, the debtor currently owns the site, the Code requires that
the debtor pay incurred response costs in full because they are expended
to preserve property belonging to the estate.156 Section 503(b)(1)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code allows the costs of preserving the estate to be
treated as admimstrative expenses.'57 Section 507(a)(1) specifies that
Id.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) (1988). The section states in pertinent part: "The court
shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with
the debtor on or has secured the claim of a creditor, to the extent that- (3) such claim
for reimbursement or contribution is contingent at the time of the allowance or disallow-
ance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution "Id.
150. Id. See In re Charter Co., 862 F.2d 1500, 1502-03 (1lth Cir. 1989). See also In re
Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 248-50 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the allowance of
contribution claim for incurred response costs and disallowance of claim for unincurred
response cost); In re Hemmingway Transport, Inc., 105 B.R. 171, 175, 178 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989) (claim for costs for remedial action undertaken by PRP at site was allowable
in the debtor's bankruptcy, however claim for costs as yet unincurred by the EPA for
which the PRP might be adjudged liable in the future was not allowable).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1988). The provision states in pertinent part, "the
confirmation of a plan- (A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified m section 502(g), 502(h), or
502(i) of this title, whether or not- (ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this
title " Id.
152. See Jonas, supra note 7, at 883.
153. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 784 (7th
Cir. 1992) (the court refused to adopt the Second Circuit's standard for dischargeability
set forth in Chateaugay because it might cut off future creditor's claims).
154. See Jonas, supra note 7, at 860.
155. Id. at 881-82.
156. See generally II U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (defining property of the estate).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part: "After
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these clais are the first ones paid out of the estate,"'8 and section
1129(a)(9) requires that the plan provide for their payment in full in or-
der for the plan to be confirmed.15 9 What constitutes "actual and neces-
sary expenses" of preserving the estate is narrowly construed." ° Actual
benefit must accrue to the estate.1 61 The expenses must be incurred to
remedy a condition that has arisen post-petition, 62 or to remedy a con-
tinuing violation of the environmental laws, 163 and not merely a pre-peti-
tion condition which does not threaten to degrade the estate.164 Thus,
response costs incurred to remedy a release or threatened release at a site
owned by the debtor which poses an mimment public health hazard and
which constitutes a continuing violation of an environmental law are ad-
minstrative expenses which the debtor must pay in full.
Discharging response costs arising out of the debtor's conduct at sites
the debtor does not own not only comports with the letter of the Code,
but also furthers its primary policies. To hold such claims non-discharge-
able might impair the fresh start by loading the reorganized debtor with
such significant and long term liability that the reorganization might not
succeed.1 65 In the face of these response costs, post-bankruptcy creditors
might consider the debtor a bad risk, and might refuse to lend to the
notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims
allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including- (1)(A) the actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate "Id.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part: "The follow-
mg expenses and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First, administrative
expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title "Id. However, these expenses may
not be the first paid where the court has allowed another creditor higher priority in order
to protect a secured creditor whose security is rendered inadequate as a result of the
automatic stay, to allow the trustee to use, sell or lease property of the debtor that secures
a creditor's claim against the debtor, or to finance the runmng of the debtor's business.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 363, 364(d) (1988). See also II U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988) (describing
this alteration in the priority scheme).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1i29(a)(9)(A) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(9) Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a
different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that- (A) with respect to a
claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1) or 507(a)(2) of this title, on the
effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive on account of
such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim
Id.
160. See In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988).
161. Id.
162. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991).
163. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,285 (1985); see also Midlantic National Bank v.
N.J. Dep't of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (the Bankruptcy Code
does not entitle a debtor to abandon property in violation of an environmental law rea-
sonably designed to protect public health or safety from identified hazards).
164. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991) (cleanup
costs incurred post-petition to clean up pre-petition spill on site owned by the debtor were
allowed as administrative expenses because the EPA was remedying the ongoing effects of
a release of hazardous substances).
165. See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
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creditor at all, or only at exorbitant rates. 166 Ultimately, the debtor might
be forced to liquidate under Chapter 7, or to dissolve under state law. 167
Finding unforeseeable costs to be non-dischargeable would similarly
defeat the policy of equality among creditors, principally temporal equal-
ity. Temporal equality requires equal treatment among similar claims no
matter when the debtor's obligation to pay will arise.16 For example, a
contract creditor whom the debtor was supposed to pay just prior to
bankruptcy is treated identically to one whom the debtor was supposed
to repay in the distant future, so long as the debtor entered in to both
contracts prior to the filing of the petition. 169 In contrast, despite the fact
that the EPA's right to payment may have arisen at the same time as
those of other unsecured creditors, 170 under a foreseeability standard, the
EPA would not have a dischargeable claim merely because it could not
foresee the extent of the debtor's liability. 171 The EPA would be able to
assert its claims against the debtor later, and receive full payment, in-
stead of settling for a pro-rata share of the assets in the bankruptcy.
However, the EPA would risk that the entity might ultimately convert
the case to Chapter 7 and liquidate its assets, leaving nothing to collect
after the bankruptcy 172 Thus, the debtor would have no assets against
which the EPA could recover. Congress sought to foreclose tlus possibil-
ity in its rejection of provability. 173 Therefore, the only way to implement
these bankruptcy policies is to discharge response costs resulting from
the debtor's pre-petition conduct at sites the debtor does not own.
Classifying CERCLA response costs arising out out of cleanups con-
ducted at sites which the debtor does not own as pre-petition dischargea-
ble claims, regardless of whether such costs have been incurred, limits
the latitude of cost distribution envisioned by the statute. 174 Neverthe-
less, discharging these costs does not preclude their recovery from an-
other source.1 75 The mequity of allowing debtor-PRPs to extinguish or
limit their liability under CERCLA has disturbed the courts, leading
them to curtail the scope of dischargeable response costs to what was
foreseeable through testing or other investigation.1 76 However, this judi-
166. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy And Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 856-57
(1984).
167. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
168. See Roe, supra note 166, at 853.
169. Id.
170. The EPA's right to payment, or claim, arises upon the release or threatened re-
lease of hazardous substances, however, it is also contingent because the EPA has not yet
incurred the response costs. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (2d Cir.
1991).
171. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 784 (1992);
In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 407-08 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
172. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
173. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 43-47 and 61-65 and accompanying text.
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cial harmonization of the statutes fails to resolve the procedural conflict
which impairs CERCLA's function. Identifying unincurred response
costs as dischargeable claims thwarts CERCLA by interrupting its pro-
cedures for determining liability and performing cleanups. Congress
must harmonize the Code and CERCLA, because regardless of whether
the EPA has notice or can foresee unincurred response costs, the bank-
ruptcy procedures so truncate essential processes governing CERCLA
clean-ups that CERCLA's substantive goals are undermined. Specifi-
cally, the process of estimating contingent claims for the purpose of in-
cluding them in the bankruptcy case allows the debtor to challenge its
liability with respect to sites the EPA may have neither investigated nor
even discovered. Twisting the Bankruptcy Code to suggest that foresee-
able response costs are dischargeable while unforeseeable response costs
are not leaves unaddressed the more significant procedural conflict be-
tween the two statutes.
II. DISCHARGING UNINCURRED CERCLA CLAIMS UNDERMINES
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CERCLA THAT ARE INTEGRAL
TO ITS SUBSTANTIVE GOALS
Discharging unincurred response costs creates a loophole through
which debtor-PRPs can challenge their liability under CERCLA prior to
any EPA enforcement action, and in some cases, even prior to discovery
of the toxic site. The language of section 113(h) does not clearly resolve
whether estimation of response costs in bankruptcy constitutes a pre-en-
forcement challenge to the debtor's CERCLA liability. 77 However, the
legislative history behind the provision indicates that the section was in-
cluded to prevent pre-enforcement challenges of liability and the con-
conutant waste of the EPA's tine and resources in duplicative
litigation."' Therefore, while an estimation hearing may not violate the
letter of CERCLA's pre-enforcement review provision, it does violate the
purpose of the provision as envisioned by Congress.
A. Pre-enforcement Review of CERCLA Liability in
the Bankruptcy Context
In In re Chateaugay Corp.,179 the court rejected the Government's ar-
gument that the factual inquiry required for the EPA to "liquidate and
fix" all claims it potentially might have against LTV for post-confirma-
tion response costs would constitute pre-enforcement review 1so The
court disagreed with the Government's argument that an estimation pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy court would result in disputes over the wisdom
177. See infra notes 242-66 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
179. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). For a description of the case see supra notes 23-36
and accompanying text.
180. Id. at 1006.
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and scope of possible remedies.18 The court found that determining the
dischargeability of response costs did not require the court to review a
direct challenge to a removal or remedial action selected under section
104 of CERCLA, and did not require the court to review any order is-
sued under section 106(a).112 Furthermore, the court held that determi-
nation of the dischargeability of the EPA's option to seek payment did
not mvolve an assessment of the debtor's liability.183 Therefore, the deci-
sion did not constitute a review of agency action under CERCLA. 8 4
In contrast, the district court in In re National Gypsum Co. 185 found
that a declaratory proceeding to determine the dischargeability of CER-
CLA liability obstructed normal CERCLA enforcement proceedings by
precluding future assertion of liability against debtors with respect to un-
discovered or unexamined sites.18 6 The EPA again argued that designa-
tion of future response costs as dischargeable claims would impermissibly
interfere with CERCLA enforcement, conflicting with the jurisdictional
bar of section 113(h).18 7 The court agreed that a challenge to liability also
constituted a challenge to a response action, impermissible under section
113(h), suggesting that the debtor's attempt to declare that future re-
sponse costs were dischargeable constituted a challenge to liability 188
Discharge of umncurred response costs ansmg from unlisted sites would
preclude the EPA from asserting liability in the future at sites not listed
m its proof of claim."8 9 However, the court mterpreted the EPA's fling
of a proof of claim as an act of enforcement which implicated the excep-
tions of section 113(h). 190 The court added that to exclude future re-
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988)). Section 9613(h) of CERCLA bars courts
from reviewing EPA removal or remedial actions unless certain criteria are met. See 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988).
183. Id. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d
997 (2d Cir. 1991).
184. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006.
185. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
186. Id. at 411.
187. 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (1988).
188. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411; see also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., v. Reilly,
889 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (5th Cir. 1989) (court held review of PRP complaint in a declara-
tory proceeding barred by § 113(h) since a PRP was not liable party until EPA had
brought a cost recovery action). Cf Manville Corp. v. United States, 139 B.R. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). The case involved Manville's liability as a PRP at four sites. At each
site the EPA had performed sufficient investigation to determine Manville's liability as a
PRP, but had failed to file a proof of claim either before or after the bar date. The court
held that unless Manville contested its liability at the sites or the methods the EPA used
to clean up those sites, the present dischargeability proceeding exceeded its purview de-
spite the fact that discharging EPA claims would be tantamount to a determination of no
liability. Id. at 104-05.
189. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 410-11.
190. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). The exceptions to CER-
CLA's general jurisdictional bar under § 9613(h) are:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or dam-
ages or for contribution. (2) An action to enforce an order issued under section
9606(a) of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order. (3) An
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sponse costs from the bankruptcy would allow the EPA to retain its
claims for post-bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the EPA could effectively
circumvent the Code "to the detriment of all other creditors whose
claims are discharged, and [to the detriment] of the [d]ebtors to the ex-
tent post-bankruptcy environmental claims impacts their ability to effec-
tively reorgamze.""19 '
B. The Estimation Process in Bankruptcy
Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a claim cognizable in
bankruptcy broadly m order to discharge as many of the debtor's out-
standing obligations as possible.1 92 To facilitate accomplishment of this
goal, Congress granted the bankruptcy court the power to estimate the
value of unliquidated' 93 or contingent 194 claims to facilitate the rapid ad-
ministration of the case.195 Courts first evaluate whether leaving liquida-
tion of the claim to processes outside the bankruptcy court would unduly
delay the administration of the bankruptcy. 196 Determining what consti-
tutes undue delay is left to judicial discretion based upon the circum-
stances of the case. For example, the courts may scrutinize the likely
duration of the liquidation process in relation to the future uncertainty of
the contingency which will ultimately determine the amount of the
claim. 19 7 A court must also evaluate whether leaving the claim unesti-
mated would hamper the court's ability to evaluate the feasibility of any
action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this title. (4) An action
under section 9659 of tins title (relating to citizens suits) alleging that the re-
moval or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under
section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.
Such an action may not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial
action is to be undertaken at the site. (5) An action under section 9606 of this
title in which the United States has moved to compel a remedial action.
Id.
191. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411.
192. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
193. While the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "unliquidated," the "courts
have consistently defined an unliquidated claim as one that is not subject to 'ready deter-
uination and precision in computation of the amount due' or 'capable of ascertainment
by reference to an agreement or by simple computation.'" In re Interco, Inc. 137 B.R.
993, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (quoting In re Fostvedt, 823 F.2d 305, 306 (9th Cir.
1987)); see In re Wenberg, 94 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 768
(9th Cir. 1990).
194. The term "contingent" is similarly undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, however
the characteristics of a contingent claim are that "the debtor's legal duty to pay does not
come into existence until triggered by the occurrence of a future event and [that] such
future occurrence was within the actual or presumed contemplation of the parties at the
time the original relationship of the parties was created." In re All Media Properties,
Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).
195. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978), repnnted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5851, 5787, 6310.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1988).
197. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.03 at 502-73 (Lawrence P King et al. eds.,
15th ed. 1993); see In re Interco, Inc., 137 B.R. 993, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
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proposed reorganization plan. 198 If confirmation must await the liquida-
tion of a claim, the claim should be estimated. 199 Indeed, the court may
not be able to determine the feasibility of the confirmation plan where
significant claims remain unliquidated. 2ni Finally, courts may also con-
sider whether estimation of a given claim would prevent "piecemeal liti-
gation" capable of jeopardizing a debtor's reorganization. 20 '
To estimate a claim, the bankruptcy court conducts a hearing at which
creditors present evidence as to the claim's true value.20 2 The procedures
used to estimate claims are similarly left to judicial discretion within cer-
tain guidelines. While section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code provides no
guidance with respect to the appropriate method for estimatmg claims,
bankruptcy courts have determined that judges should use the methods
best suited to obtain a reasonably accurate evaluation of the claims. The
court may accept a claimant's assessment of her claim at face value, esti-
mate the claim at zero and waive its discharge under section 1141(d),20 3
or employ arbitration or a jury trial in order to accurately resolve its
value.2° The hearing need not provide the same degree of certainty as
198. Interco, 137 B.R. at 998.
199. In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985).
200. See, e.g., In re Lane, 68 B.R. 609, 611 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986) (claim must be
estimated where awaiting the outcome of pending state trial proceedings would unduly
delay case); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 40 B.R. 1014 (D. Haw. 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d
1374, 1382 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985) (without benefit of estimate of the claim which could
result from a favorable judgment in a civil case, the bankruptcy could not have ade-
quately estimated the plan's feasibility). Section 1129(a)( 11) of the Bankruptcy Code pre-
conditions confirmation of a reorganization plan upon a bankruptcy court's
determination that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquida-
tion, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the
debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan."
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
201. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
202. See Bittner, 691 F.2d at 135. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) grants the bankruptcy
court the authority to hear and determine all core proceedings arising in cases under the
code, including estimation of claims or interests for the purpose of allowance or confirma-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988). The provision states:
(b)(1)Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arsing in a case under title 11, re-
ferred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders
and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title. (2) Core pro-
ceedings include, but are not limited to (B) allowance or disallowance of
claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estima-
tion of claims or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter
11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for
purposes of distribution in a case under title 11
Id., see In re Federal Press Co., 116 B.R. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); see also Bank-
ruptcy Rule 3018(a): "Nonwithstanding objection to a claim or interest, the court after
notice and hearing may temporarily allow the claim or interest in an amount which the
court deems proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan." Id.
203. See Bittner, 691 F.2d at 135.
204. In re Federal Press Co., 116 B.R. at 653. Jury trials and arbitration are generally
reserved for unusual cases where no other methods will suffice. See Bittner v. Borne
1993]BALANCING CERCLA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 269
would a trial on the ments; it need only be sufficiently comprehensive to
provide a reasonable basis for estimating claims.205 The substantive re-
quirements of the hearing are also left to the court's discretion. The court
must evaluate the evidence put forth and argued by the parties in accord-
ance with the legal rules governing the ultimate value of the claim.20 6 For
example, the worth of a claim based upon an alleged breach of contract is
estimated in accordance with contract law 207 In the context of CER-
CLA liability, therefore, the court must base its evaluation upon CER-
CLA and the related regulations which establish the legal framework of
the claims.208
In theory, the estimation has limited effect. It fixes the value of claims
solely for the purpose of their allowance in the bankruptcy case, and is
relevant only for determining the claim's share in the assets of the bank-
ruptcy 209 The estimation is not for non-bankruptcy purposes,21" and
thus has no effect upon the ultimate liquidation of the claim in a non-
bankruptcy forum. In practice, however, the estimated value often caps
the amount recoverable on the claim regardless of its outcome in state
court.211 The Code's discharge provisions make no exception for claims
estimated for purposes of confirmation which are ultimately liquidated in
a non-bankruptcy proceeding.212 Thus, once a Chapter 11 case closes, the
amount which the plan allots to a particular claimant on a particular
claim caps what that creditor may recover from the debtor regardless of
any subsequent larger judgment, unless an exception is made in the reor-
gamzation plan.213 More than one court has concluded that section
502(c), when read with section 502(j), establishes the claim's outer lim-
Chemical Co., Inc., 691 F.2d at 135 (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.03 (Law-
rence P King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1981).
205. Baldwin, 55 B.R. at 899.
206. Bittner, 691 F.2d at 135.
207. Id.
208. See In re National Gypsum Co., No. 390-97213-SA.F-11, 1992 WL 426464
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24, 1992).
209. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 502.02, 502-18 to 502-23 (Lawrence P King
et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993); see, eg., In re Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 143 B.R.
612, 619 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 B.R. 823, 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
210. See In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 23 B.R. 62, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982); In
re Lane, 68 B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986); In re Interco, Inc., 137 B.R. at 998-99.
211. See, eg., In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1986) (limiting ultimate distributions to creditors on basis of estimated value for purposes
of confirming plan, rather than ultimate liquidated value, is sensible because there is a
limit to what may be distributed regardless of the amount recovered in state court); In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1985) ("If liability is ultimately
found [in the non-bankruptcy court proceeding], claimants would then be able to receive
payment up to the amount of the judgment or the estimated value, whichever is lower")
(emphasis added).
212. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141(d), 1328 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
213. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[N]othing
prevents the speedy and rough estimation of CERCLA claims for purposes of determin-
ing EPA's voice in the Chapter 11 proceedings, with ultimate liquidation of the claims to
await the outcome of normal CERCLA enforcement proceedings in which EPA will be
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its, subject only to a section 502(j) motion for reconsideration.2" 4
C. Congress' Reasons for Prohibiting Pre-enforcement Review
Congress enacted CERCLA to combat the threat to public health
and the environment presented by improper disposal of hazardous
waste.215  Congress added CERCLA's jurisdictional bar, section
entitled to collect its allowable share (full or pro-rata, depending upon the reorganization
plan) ").
214. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); see, ag.,
In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (referrng to
Congressman Kindness' statements: "Mr. Kindess' view permit[s] the bankruptcy
court to distribute to the creditors on the basis of its estimates for the purposes of con-
firming a Chapter 11 plan. It makes good sense because there is a limit to what may be
distributed no matter how much is recovered in the district court or the state court
1) .
As an alternative to this harsh outcome, some courts have cited § 502(j), which pro-
vides for the reconsideration of both allowed and disallowed claiins by the court for
cause. See, e.g., In re M Corp. Financial, Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1992); In re MacDonald, 128 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re Lane, 68 B.R.
609, 613 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986). Section 502(j) provides:
A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A
reconsidered claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of
the case. Reconsideration of a claim under this subsection does not affect the
validity of any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an
allowed claim on account of such allowed claim that is not reconsidered, but if a
reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the same class as such holder's claim,
such holder may not receive any additional payment or transfer from the estate
on account of such holder's allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered
and allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim proportionate in
value to that already received by such other holder. This subsection does not
alter or modify the trustee's right to recover from a creditor any excess pay-
ment or transfer made to such creditor.
11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (1988).
However, it is unclear that "cause" within the meaning of the provision means the
awaited liquidation of a claim by judgment in another court. Traditional grounds for
reconsideration of claims have included the discovery of new facts, the discovery of new
evidence to support the facts that could not have been discovered sooner, or the discovery
of clear errors in the order of allowance. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 502.10 at 502-
107 (Lawrence P King et al. eds, 15th ed. 1993). After a case has closed, however, there
is no indication in the Code or the Rules that Congress intended that creditors should be
able to reopen a case to improve their distribution under a confirmation plan. See 11
U.S.C. § 350(b) (1988). The statute reads, "[a] case may be reopened in the court in
which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for
other cause." Id. Cause sufficient to reopen a case is generally found in circumstances of
fraud, newly discovered evidence with respect to a claim, or mistake. See 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 350.03 at 350-7 (Lawrence P King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993). Reopening
cases to increase a creditor's distributive share of the estate after liquidation of the
amount in another court would destroy the finality of confirmation under Chapter 11.
215. See, e.g., Voluntary Purchasing Groups v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989).
CERCLA's provisions serve two goals:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the
tools necessary for prompt and effective response to problems of a national mag-
nitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended
that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons
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113(h),21 6 through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA) 217 to preclude judicial review of removal or remedial
actions prior to their completion, unless one of the designated exceptions
applies.2"8 Section 113(h) of CERCLA bars judicial review of removal or
remedial action selected under section 104,219 or to review any action
under section 106(a),220 unless the EPA is attempting to recover costs or
damages, is attempting to enforce an order issued under section 106(a),
or is attempting to compel a remedial action.221 Removal action includes
site assessment as well as physical cleanup of the site.222 Remedial action
bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created.
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982); see
also Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 823 F.2d 977, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1987).
216. Section 113(h) of CERCLA provides m pertinent part: "No federal court shall
have jurisdiction under federal law to review any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section
9606(a) of this title, m any action " 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988).
217. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified m scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(5) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or dam-
ages or for contribution. (2) An action to enforce an order issued under section
9606(a) of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order. (3) An
action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this title. (4) An action
under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging that the re-
moval or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under
section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.
Such an action may not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial
action is to be undertaken at the site. (5) An action under section 9606 of this
title m which the United States has moved to compel a remedial action.
Id.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or sub-
stantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the national contin-
gency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial
action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any
time or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment
Id.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the evironment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may
require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may
be necessary to abate such danger or threat
Id.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). For pertinent text of statute see supra note 219.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The terms "remove' or "removal" means [sic] the cleanup or removal of re-
leased substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary
to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous
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focuses upon physical intervention in and amelioration of the site.223 The
bar lasts until the remedy set forth in the record of decision (ROD) is
fully implemented.224
Prior to SARA's enactment, courts had found an implicit jurisdic-
tional bar within CERCLA. 225 Because Congress allowed the EPA to
proceed with cleanup prior to any express determination identifying the
responsible parties, courts held that Congress had intended that determi-
nations of liability for a given site should not delay remedial action. "To
delay remedial action until the liability situation is unscrambled would be
inconsistent with the statutory plan to promptly eliminate the sources of
danger to health and environment. " 226
substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions
as may be necessary to prevent, minmize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or to the environment
Id.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988). The statute provides m pertinent part: "The terms
"remedy" or "remedial action" means [sic] those actions consistent with permanent rem-
edy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions to prevent or minimize the
release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to
present or future public health." Id.
224. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317 (response actions may be challenged only after all activi-
ties set forth in the ROD specific to that phase of the cleanup have been completed).
225. See, e.g., Wheaton v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986); Lone Pine Steer-
ing Committee v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985) (pre-enforcement review con-
trary to the policies underlying CERCLA).
226. Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 886. The process of remedying a CERCLA site can be
long and complicated. The EPA is authorized to take any response measure consistent
with the national contingency plan which the EPA considers necessary to safeguard the
public health and welfare or the environment whenever any hazardous substance is re-
leased or there is a substantial threat of such a release. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). Upon
discovery of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance EPA performs a
preliminary evaluation of the site's overall risk according to the Hazardous Ranking Sys-
tem (HRS). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9605(c) (1988); see 40 C.F.R. § 300.405 (1992). Seegener-
ally Eagle-Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Sites with a
sufficiently high HRS score may be placed upon the National Priority List (NPL) of sites
demanding immediate attention after notice and comment. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)-(d)
(1992). CERCLA requires either the EPA or a PRP to prepare an RI/FS to determine
the nature and extent of the threat presented by the release and to evaluate proposed
remedies. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d)-(e) (1992); see 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). The EPA
then selects an appropriate remedy from among the range of alternatives considered for
that site. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (1992). This decision is based upon the administra-
tive record developed during the RI/FS and must meet all applicable federal, state, and
local statutory cleanup requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988). The EPA must publish
notice of all proposed remedial plans and provide the public an opportunity for notice
and comment prior to any plan's adoption. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988). The remedy ulti-
mately selected is embodied in a record of decision (ROD). 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)
(1992).
After issuing its ROD, the EPA has a number of options available. It can solicit or
compel PRPs to undertake the removal or remedial action through a unilateral adminis-
trative order. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). It can seek judicial relief through the Attorney
General "as may be necessary to abate [the] danger or threat" of a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance to public health and welfare. Id. EPA can also perform
the cleanup itself and sue the PRPs for reimbursement of expended Superfund monies. 42
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Congress took this articulation of CERCLA's goals to heart in draft-
ing the provision banning pre-enforcement judicial review. 2 27 The legis-
lative history of the SARA amendments demonstrates that Congress
sought to prevent the delay228 and piecemeal review229 associated with
allowing PRPs to challenge their liability or EPA selection of remedies
for a particular site before its cleanup had been completed.23° During the
floor debate, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee which drafted the provision, expanded this ban to deter-
minations of "potential liability for a response action- other than in a
suit for contribution- unless the suit falls within one of the [exempt]
categories of this section . ,,231 Thus, Congress implicitly valued
prompt cleanup over determinations of liability or the review of poten-
tially inadequate or flawed response plans2 32 because resolution of such
issues did not advance Superfund's prime goal- expeditious cleanup of
hazardous wastes. Congress allowed limited attack on removal or reme-
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). However EPA chooses to respond to the site, it must "address
the long-term effectiveness of various alternatives" in selecting a remedy. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(b)(1) (1988). Should the selected action fail to remove all pollutants or contami-
nants from the site, the EPA must review the remedial action "no less often than each 5
years after the initiation of such remedial action to assure that human health and the
environment are being protected by the remedial action being implemented." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(c) (1988). The EPA may take further action at a site if it believes such action is
warranted. Id.
227. See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1985).
As several courts have noted, the scheme and purposes of CERCLA would be
disrupted by affording review of orders or response actions prior to commence-
ment of a government enforcement or cost recovery action. See, e.g., Lone Pine
Steering Comittee v. EPA, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) [1113] 1118 [sic] (D.N.J.
Jan. 21, 1985). These cases correctly interpret CERCLA with regard to the
unavailability of pre-enforcement review. This amendment [§ 9613(h)] is to ex-
pressly recognize theat pre-enforcement review would be a significant obstacle
to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders.
Pre-enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in providing cleanups,
would increase response costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary
cleanups.
Id., see 132 CONG. R c. 29,735 (statement of Sen. Glickman reaffirming that 9613(h)
essentially ratifies existing case law on the timing of review).
228. "Without such a provision, responses to releases or threatened releases of hazard-
ous substances could be unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of damage to
human health or the environment." H.R. REP. No. 99-253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148.
229. 132 CONG. Rnc. 28,441 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
230. H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3046.
231. 132 CONG. REc. 28,441 (Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
When the essence of a lawsuit involves contesting the liability of the plaintiff for
cleanup costs, the courts should apply the other provisions of section 113(h),
which require such plaintiff to wait until the Government has filed a suit under
sections 106 or 107 to seek review of the liability issue.
132 CONG. REc. 29754 (statement of Sen. Stafford, chairman of the Conference Commit-
tee); see also 132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (statement of Sen. Stafford).
232. North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 753 F Supp. 1413, 1417 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 930
F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991).
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dial actions through CERCLA's citizen suit provision, and then only if
the suit alleged that the EPA was conducting a cleanup m a manner
inconsistent with another CERCLA provision.233
While the court opinions have been broadly guided by the legislative
history of section 113(h), courts have still searched the statute itself for
policies to guide their interpretation. 234 The policies they have discovered
include: avoiding patchwork litigation which increases response costs
and depletes the resources of all parties,235 avoiding inconsistent re-
suits; 236 deference to EPA decisions m its area of expertise; 237 minimizing
the amount of environmental damages which could result from delay
caused by litigation;238 ensuring that review, when it does occur, is based
upon sufficient mformation;239 and the courts' assessment that Congress
233. 132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (statement of Sen. Stafford). Senator Stafford's remarks
cautioning courts to distinguish carefully between a citizen challenge to the legality of
EPA action and a PRP challenge to a remedy selection "in sheep's clothing" demon-
strated Congressional intent to preclude all PRP interference with EPA remedial or re-
moval action:
Complaints should be examined to preclude efforts to present such cases as "cit-
izen suits" challenging illegal response action. The crucial distinction between
these two types of suits is that plaintiffs concerned with the monetary conse-
quences of a response can be made whole after the cleanup is completed by
reducing the amount of the Government's recovery. But citizens asserting a true
public health or environmental interest m the response cannot obtain adequate
relief if an inadequate cleanup is allowed to proceed and, in effect, create a
nuisance or a violation of this or other laws. Delay in the timing of suits seeking
monetary damages does not diminish the court's ability to grant later and ade-
quate relief. However, delay in the timing of suits seeking an equitable order
modifying the proposed response action would undermine the court's ability,
either legally or practically, to grant adequate and timely relief at a later date.
Id.
234. Voluntary Purchasing, 889 F.2d at 1389 (where declaratory judgment would not
have delayed any actual cleanup of hazardous substances or discouraged voluntary
cleanup by PRPs, the overall philosophy of the statute, as demonstrated by its structure
and legislative history, guided the court).
235. See id. at 1390 ("[S]anctioning [Voluntary Purchasing Group's] declaratory judg-
ment actions could lead to inefficient uses of EPA resources and would certainly detract
from the EPA's ability to apportion its enforcement resources as it deems most appropri-
ate."); see also Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1991).
EPA resources may be wasted by defending against a declaratory judgment action
brought by PRP's who although "identified as potentially liable suffer no harm before the
EPA initiates an enforcement action since the agency might never seek to collect from
them." Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Comment, Cercla and the Constitution: Reardon v.
United States Permits Constitutional Jurisdiction and Invalidates the Federal Lien, 26 GA.
L. Rnv 861, 871 (1992) (citing Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly. 927 F.2d 289, 293-94
(6th Cir. 1991) and J.V Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985)).
236. See Voluntary Purchasing, 889 F.2d at 1390.
237. See, e.g., North Shore, 753 F Supp at 1418 ("Congress apparently intended both
to facilitate prompt cleanup action and to give some deference to the judgment of the
USEPA [sic], which it created to protect the public interest in enforcing federal environ-
mental laws.").
238. See Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (1lth Cir. 1987).
239. See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991). For example:
Notices of liens are likely to be filed early in the history of a response action
At that point, EPA is likely not yet to know the full extent of the contam-
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weighted protecting the environment more heavily than determining lia-
bility.2 ° The breadth of policies which the courts have found to support
CERCLA's bar against pre-enforcement review indicate the significance
of the provision to the operation of the statute.241
D. Estimation Hearings Constitute Pre-enforcement Review
As written, section 113(h) of CERCLA appears to preclude only judi-
cial review which would interfere with the actual physical cleanup. Sec-
tion 113(h) forbids a court from reviewing challenges to selected removal
or remedial actions.242 As defined by CERCLA, both "removal ' 24 3 and
"remedial" 2 actions are generally those designed to directly or indi-
rectly ameliorate the physical aspects of the site, contain the toxic re-
lease, or otherwise protect public health in the area of the site.
Estimating the value of a claim for response costs determines the dollar
amount of the debtor's liability and does not affect the physical remedia-
tion of a site. While "removal action" encompasses investigation of sites,
"such actions as may be necessary to moitor, assess, and evaluate the
release or threat of release of toxic substances," 245 an estimation hearing
does not necessarily obstruct investigation. Rather, a looming estimation
hearing may force parties to expedite their efforts. Therefore, according
to the letter of the statute, the Second Circuit's interpretation m In re
246Chateaugay Corp. was correct; an estimation hearing does not effect
pre-enforcement review
Viewed from the broader perspective of the congressional intent am-
nation, let alone when that contamination occurred, or whether it is likely that
the owner exercised due care or took reasonable precautions. One purpose of
§ 9613(h), we believe, is to delay review until enough is known to decide these
issues.
Id.
240. See North Shore, 753 F Supp at 1417; Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
EPA, 673 F Supp. 1043, 1055 (D. Kan. 1987).
241. Indeed, these policies have been so influential that some cases have held that not
even constitutional challenges would be allowed to interrupt EPA remedial action. See,
e.g., South Macomb Disposal Authority v. EPA, 681 F Supp. 1244, 1251 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (because section 9613(h) limits when rather than whether a constitutional chal-
lenge may be brought, it did not completely and unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of
due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment, and it is a proper exercise of Congres-
sional power); Barmet, 927 F.2d at 295-96 (where EPA has undertaken no cost recovery
actions, no due process implications result from delay in availability of a hearing to con-
test constitutionality of EPA action). But see Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that while § 9613(h) does remove the court's jurisdiction to re-
view the substance or merits of EPA response actions or orders, the section did not bar
the court from hearing constitutional facial challenges to CERCLA, and that CERCLA
lien provisions violate the fifth amendment due process clause). See generally, Faulkner,
supra note 235.
242. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988).
244. Id. at § 9601(24) (1988).
245. Id. at § 9601(23) (1988).
246. 944 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1991).
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mating the provision, it becomes apparent that estimation hearings raise
other obstacles to implementation of CERCLA, which are more indirect
but no less intrusive. The entire purpose of an estimation hearing is to
determine the monetary amount of a claim against the debtor which can-
not be liquidated prior to the close of the bankruptcy, i.e., the debtor's
financial liability with respect to the claim. 247 However, Congress has
clearly stated that cleanup must take precedence over determinations of
liability 248 As the court noted in In re National Gypsum Co.,249 the dis-
charge of unincurred response costs fixes the debtor's financial liability
under CERCLA wherever the debtor's pre-petition conduct has caused a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, regardless of
whether those sites have been investigated or even discovered. 250 When
the EPA finally establishes the debtor's liability as a responsible party at
those sites post-bankruptcy, it will be precluded from asserting liability
against the debtor by the debtor's discharge.251 To the extent that the
EPA receives payment from the debtor, the estimation proceeding caps
the amount recoverable.252 Any subsequent judgment in excess of the
estimated value is unrecoverable because the EPA's claim against the
debtor will have been discharged upon the close of the bankruptcy 253
Therefore, the estimation process clearly constitutes pre-enforcement re-
view to the extent that it defines the scope of a debtor-PRP's financial
liability under CERCLA prior to cleanup.
Courts have also acknowledged the need to assure that review of re-
sponse costs or enforcement actions is based upon sufficient informa-
tion.254 Under the expedited conditions of an estimation hearing, the
EPA may not be in a position to provide the court with complete infor-
mation regarding a specific site. Remedies and the attendant response
costs are site-specific.255 To estimate the response costs for a given site,
the court should have site-specific scientific evidence and evidence con-
cerning the procedure and cost of proposed remedies. 25 6 Unfortunately,
site investigation and remedy development are quite slow. 2 57 To deter-
mine the estimated costs, the EPA may have to decide upon a given rem-
edy proposal in the absence of sufficient investigation. 258 Therefore, the
247. See supra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
249. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
250. Id. at 410-11.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 239.
255. See supra note 226.
256. See generally In re National Gypsum Co., No. 390-93213-SAF-11, 1992 WL
426464 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24, 1992) (providing a transcript of estimation proceed-
ings concerning CERCLA claims).
257. See Jonas, supra note 7, at 882 n.236.
258. Indeed, the EPA may still be in the process of unearthing all the possible PRPs
for a given site. The number of PRPs, as well as their conduct at the site, affects the
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bankruptcy court's estimation of the debtor's liability may not accurately
determine the amount of response costs.
Finally, Congress and the courts have noted that section 113(h) pre-
vents piecemeal review and wasteful litigation.25 9 If the EPA is currently
litigating tins issue in another federal court, the litigation and discovery
involved in that case may be identitcal to the information necessary for
an estimation hearing.2 6° Thus the hearing is duplicative and wasteful of
EPA resources.
The district court in In re National Gypsum Co.,26 1 however, argued
that even if dischargmg claims for CERCLA response costs constitutes
pre-enforcement review with respect to sites where the EPA has not yet
assessed liability against the debtor, by filing a proof of claim, the EPA
engages in an enforcement or cost-recovery measure triggering the excep-
tions of section 113(h). Under section 113(h) of CERCLA, all federal
courts are deprived of jurisdiction to review challenges to the enumerated
actions available to the EPA unless the action fits one of the listed excep-
tions.262 The listed exceptions outline various enforcement or cost recov-
ery actions, including actions to recover response costs or damages for
contribution.263 However, the EPA's procedural posture in the situation
where this exception would normally apply is noticeably different from
its posture when it fies a proof of clama in bankruptcy Under section
107(a) of CERCLA, the EPA can pursue a PRP for response costs if
they have been incurred, i.e., liquidated by completion of the site
cleanup. 2 4 When the EPA files a claim in bankruptcy, it merely pre-
serves its right to recover against the debtor and its right to vote on the
plan. Indeed, the Code obligates it to fie a proof of claim or find its claim
liability equation. For example, the agency may not know if the debtor is one of 10 PRPs,
and should bear a tenth of the burden, or if the debtor is one of 100 PRPs, and should
bear a hundredth of the burden (assuming equal culpability).
Furthermore, this expedited remedy determination forecloses the requisite public com-
ment procedure. The EPA must allow the public to comment upon proposed remedies
before finalizing the remedy to be undertaken in a record of decision. 42 U.S.C. § 9617
(1988).
259. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (5th Cir.
1989); see generally supra notes 227-41 and accompanying text.
260. For example, the determination of the amount of the debtor's CERCLA liability
in an estimation procedure in bankruptcy court may duplicate an ongoing recovery and
damage action under CERCLA in a district court. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding the district court's injunction of
further litigation of the City's claims in a California bankruptcy court for reasons of
judicial economy).
261. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988).
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(5) (1988). See supra note 218 for pertinent text of
statute.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part: "[Any person
fitting the description of a PRP] shall be liable for- (A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan "Id. (emphasis added).
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against the debtor forever barred.265 Furthermore, section 107(a) of
CERCLA precludes the EPA from recovering response costs before it
has incurred them;266 thus, when the agency files its proof of claim, it
cannot yet enforce any rights it subsequently may have under section
107(a) with respect to those costs. Filing a proof of claim cannot trigger
the exceptions to section 113(h). Therefore, in discharging unincurred
response costs, bankruptcy courts conduct pre-enforcement review.
However, since courts have generally accorded the Bankruptcy Code
preeminence over CERCLA when determining the dischargeability of
claims, they refuse to recognize that section 113(h) deprives them of ju-
risdiction to determine the amount of the debtor's liability for these
costs.
2 67
III. POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE BETWEEN
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND CERCLA
By tying the dischargeability of response costs to their foreseeability,
the courts in Chicago, Milwaukee, St.Paul & Pacific R.R.265 and In re
National Gypsum CO.2 69 sought to prevent the discharge of costs that
would be incurred at undiscovered sites, and thus increase the proportion
of response costs ultimately paid by the debtor. Intially, tlus appears
counterintuitive. In theory, the Code ensures that creditors are paid as
much as possible by including contingent claims in the bankruptcy,
rather than by excluding them.270 When a creditor fies a proof of claim,
the Code guarantees that the creditor is entitled to share in the distribu-
tion of the debtor's assets.27 x Indeed, the Code demands that the creditor
participate in the bankruptcy or be forever barred from asserting her
claim against the debtor.272
265. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge m a case under this title- (1) voids any judgment at any time
obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal
liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727,
944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continua-
tion of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived
Id.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
267. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 977, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to
make exceptions to the Code in favor of CERCLA without clear evidence of congres-
sional intent that it should be done); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 411
(N.D. Tex. 1992) (stretching the concept of what constitutes an exception to section
113(h) of CERCLA in order to have jurisdiction over the claims for response costs be-
cause to find otherwise would defeat the objectives of the Code).
268. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
269. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
270. See supra notes 70-141 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
272. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
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The courts' holdings n In re Chateaugay Corp,273 Chicago and Gyp-
sum demonstrated the occasionally pyrrhlc effect that the operation of
the Code can have on contingent environmental claims where the debtor
is a sizeable corporation who, post-bankruptcy, might be financially able
to pay at least part of the response costs. Although participation in the
bankruptcy guarantees that the EPA is entitled to receive the estimated
value of its response costs to the extent possible in the plan, it also pro-
hibits the EPA from collecting more than the estimated amount of its
response costs if the actual costs exceed the estimated amount. The esti-
mated value itself is m all likelihood maccurate. The costs are estimated
by the judge rather than liquidated at the conclusion of the EPA
cleanup.274 Furthermore, the EPA may not have fully investigated, or
even discovered, the debtor's liability as a PRP at certain sites. The lack
of investigation handicaps the EPA's ability to substantiate its estimate
of the response costs. If, however, the EPA could withhold its claims
from the bankruptcy and proceed against the reorganized debtor through
the EPA's normal channels, it might recover more because the agency
would have better evidence to support its claims, and because it would
not have to share the debtor's assets with other unsecured creditors.
Therefore, the very process intended to protect the EPA's right to pay-
ment of its claims also guarantees that, where the debtor's CERCLA
liability has not been fully discovered, it will not receive full payment.
While the Code contemplates that creditors may receive only partial pay-
ment or even nothing at all m satisfaction of their claims,275 the made-
(a) A discharge m a case under this title- (1) voids any judgment at any time
obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal
liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727,
944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continua-
tion of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived; and- (3) operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an
act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor of the
kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the com-
mencement of the case, on account of any allowable community claim, except a
community claim that is excepted from discharge
Id.
273. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
274. See supra notes 176-214 and accompanying text.
275. For example, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, assets are distributed to creditors in the
order specified m section 726(a) until they run out. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988). If a partic-
ular class of creditors designated under section 726(a) cannot be paid in full from the
remaining assets, section 726(b) provides that they share the remainder on a pro rata
basisJd at § 726(b). Similarly, in a Chapter 11 reorganization, section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
allows the court to confirm a plan despite objections from an impaired class, if no mem-
ber of a class junior to the class of unsecured creditors receives or retains any property. In
short, equity security holders, who are more junior to unsecured creditors, cannot receive
or retain property from the debtor's assets if the unsecured creditors are not paid. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988); see Roe, supra note 166, at 850-51.
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quacy of such outcomes is exacerbated where insufficent information
may have artificially depressed a claim's estimated value.
The courts' responses to this problem indicate possible avenues for leg-
islative improvement of the treatment of CERCLA liability under the
Bankruptcy Code. The introduction of a foreseeability standard in the
analysis of what constitutes a contingent claim effects two principal alter-
ations to the normal treatment of such claim under the Code. Foresee-
ability narrows the definition of a contingent claim by placing an
evidentiary requirement upon it; only those response costs arising out of
sites where a certain degree of investigation has taken place constitute
dischargeable claims. Foreseeability also assures that the claims which
are discharged are more likely to have been sufficiently investigated, and
thus it should improve the accuracy of the estimation of the response
costs. Therefore, the Chicago and Gypsum courts' holdings suggest that
an effective compromise between the two statutes must provide that the
estimation of environmental claims be supported by sufficient evidence.
In other words, if the costs will arise out of sites where the debtor is a
known or suspected PRP, an evidentiary standard should require that
the EPA have completed a certain amount of investigation at that site
before the court may estimate the potential response costs. If the costs
will arise out of undiscovered sites, or sites which have been discovered
but at which the debtor has not yet been identified as a PRP, they should
not be dischargeable. The onus shifts to the debtor to assist the EPA in
discovering and investigating sites by disclosing all relevant information
to the agency.
A. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
This section proposes two amendments to the Code to improve the
recovery of response costs. First, Congress should add a provision to sec-
tion 523 excepting from discharge response costs at undiscovered sites, or
at sites where the debtor's liability is unknown. Second, Congress should
develop an evidentiary standard for the estimation of response costs at
discovered sites where the debtor's liability is known in order to improve
the accuracy of the estimate.
1. Congress Should Except From Discharge Response Costs Which
Will Arise From Undiscovered Sites
Congress should except from discharge claims for CERCLA response
costs which will arise from undiscovered sites, or sites at which the
debtor has not yet been identified as a PRP Under the Code's definition
of a contingent claim cognizable in bankruptcy, foreseeability is irrele-
vant; due process requires only that the creditor have notice of the bank-
ruptcy, not of her claim.2 76 To except a contingent claim for response
costs from discharge on the basis of whether or not the site is known to
276. See supra notes 70-177 and accompanying text.
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the EPA is to except an otherwise dischargeable claim on the illegitimate
basis of its foreseeability. Understandably, such concessions are moti-
vated by the desire to facilitate the protection of the environment. Fortu-
nately, this sort of compromise already exists in the Code. Through
section 523, Congress has abridged the power of the Bankruptcy Code in
order to protect certain social obligations and to punish certain bad
acts.277 Section 523 of the Code prevents individual debtors from using it
to undermine society's means of punishing illegal conduct, 278 or to un-
dermine significant social obligations such as child support, by discharg-
ing these debts.279 While it remains unclear whether Congress considers
a debtor's responsibility to refrain from polluting the environment to be
an appropriate social obligation for such protection, it is clear that Con-
gress views the exception from discharge as the tool to enforce such an
obligation.
A proposed amendment to section 523 should apply to all debtors in
Chapter 11. It should except from discharge umncurred response costs at
sites which are undiscovered or at which the debtor has not been identi-
fied as a PRP at the time of the bankruptcy The section might read:
(f) a discharge under section 1141 of this title does not discharge a
debtor from any and all costs for which it may be liable under section
107(a) of CERCLA arising from sites which, at the time of confirma-
tion, are undiscovered by the Environmental Protection Agency or, if
discovered, at which the debtor has not yet been determined to be a
responsible person.
The amendment would introduce two new elements into section 523: an
exception for CERCLA response costs, and an exception from discharge
applicable to non-mdividual debtors. Excepting the costs of cleaning sites
contaminated by the debtor resembles other exceptions which similarly
prevent the debtor from using bankruptcy to shirk debts which are ar-
277. Indeed, Congress recently has appeared willing to expand § 523 in an attempt to
prevent individuals guilty of savings and loan fraud from discharging criminal judgments
and restitution orders. See 136 CONG. REc. S. 255 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Dole addressing the Taxpayer Recovery Act). However, it must be noted that this
proposed bill would have rendered non-dischargeable criminal penalties levied against
individuals guilty of defrauding a thrift institution. This sort of exception was clearly
contemplated by the original drafters of the section. Thus, adding this provision to § 523
breaks no new ground in terms of expanding the type of claim, or the type of public
policy goals, preserved under the section. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (7) (1988).
278. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The section bars discharge of
debts incurred through use of fraudulent written representations of the debtor's financial
condition, id. at (a)(2), of debts for fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity, id. at (a)(4),
of debts resulting from willful and malicious injury of another, id. at (a)(6), of personal
injury claims against the debtor arising out of the debtor's drunk driving, id. at (a)(9), of
a judgment, order or settlement arising from debtor's act of fraud in connection with a
thrift, id. at (a)(1 1), and of debts for failure to fulfill a fiduciary commitment in connec-
tion with a thrift, id. at (a)(12).
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). These sections bar discharge of debts owed creditors
known to the debtor whom the debtor failed to notify of the bankruptcy, id. at (a)(3), and
debts for alimony or child support, zd. at (a)(5).
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guably also social obligations.28 ° However, Congress has indicated that
the exceptions apply only to individual debtors.281 When drafting the
Code, Congress refused to extend the exceptions of section 523(a) to non-
individual debtors,282 because it would undermine the stability of reorga-
nizations. If section 523 debts could be excepted from discharge, the
debtor would not be able to provide creditors with a definite picture of its
liabilities prior to confirmation, and thus creditors would not be able to
make an informed judgment regarding the debtor's financial health.283
If significant liabilities, such as environmental liabilities, were not
discharged, the resulting uncertainty would also make it difficult to de-
termine the likelihood of the debtor requiring further financial reorgani-
zation or liquidation.284
The proposed amendment's narrow focus, however, eliminates much
of the destabilizing effects feared by Congress. Because the amendment
excepts only claims for response costs which will arise from undiscovered
sites, or sites at which the debtor has not been identified as a PRP, it
limits the excepted liability to costs unknown at the time of the bank-
ruptcy As this liability has no cognizable value until its discovery by the
EPA, creditors cannot evaluate its impact in any meaningful way when
assessing the debtor's financial stability For the same reason, a judge
cannot evaluate its impact when assessing the feasibility of the reorgani-
zation. Thus, this limited extension of a 523 exception to a non-individ-
ual debtor should not subvert congressional goals for reorganizations.
Preventing the discharge of unincurred response costs arising out of a
debtor's undiscovered liability under CERCLA is the most advantageous
compromise of the two statutes for several reasons. First, as an exception
from discharge, it does not narrow the overall concept of a dischargeable
contingent claim as does a foreseeability standard. Second, it limits the
dischargeability of response costs unknown to the EPA. Third, it bases
the non-dischargeabiity of environmental claims upon a clear standard,
discovery of the site. Fourth, it still allows a significant amount of the
debtor's liability, that stemming from discovered sites, to be discharged.
Furthermore, a debtor who informs the EPA of its potential liability can
increase the proportion of CERCLA liability discharged in the bank-
ruptcy, thus promoting discovery and full investigation of hazardous
sites. Finally, preserving undiscovered liability from the bankruptcy will
280. See supra notes 278-79.
281. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1141(d).
282. See Delco Dev. Co. of Harrison Rd. v. Kuempel Co. (In re Kuempel), 14 B.R.
324 (Bankr. S.D. Oluo 1981). The draft of 1141(d) in Senate bill, as reported by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, contained a provision extending 523 to non-individual debt-
ors. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1141(d)(2) (1978) (as reported by the Judiciary
Comittee). This provision was dropped in the final version adopted by the Senate. See S.
2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1141(d)(2) (1978).
283. See Kuempel, 14 B.R. at 327; Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants
as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place
in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 159, 165 (1988).
284. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
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not degrade the debtor's ability to secure financing or to attract investors;
neither creditors nor potential investors can meanmgfully assess undis-
covered liability resulting from pre-petition conduct any more than they
can accurately predict liability resulting from post-confirmation conduct.
The risk of unknown CERCLA liability is always present no matter
when the creditors lend or the investors invest.28 5
2. Develop an Evidentiary Standard for Estimation of
Environmental Claims
Because the foregoing solution addresses only claims resulting from
undiscovered sites, Congress should also develop an evidentiary standard
for the estimation of environmental response costs arising out of discov-
ered sites. By setting a floor for the amount of investigation that the EPA
must have completed at a particular discovered site before the claims
could be estimated, Congress could improve the accuracy of the estima-
tion. Three points during a typical CERCLA cleanup present themselves
as a possible baseline for investigation. In order for a site to be placed
upon the National Priorities List (NPL) of toxic sites requiring immedi-
ate action, a preliminary assessment is conducted, followed by public no-
tice and comment.286 Subsequently, the EPA conducts a remedial
investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS). Normally, after completion
of an RI/FS, the EPA makes its imtial selection of an appropriate rem-
edy from among the range of alternatives considered for the site.287 After
public notice and comment, the final remedy selection is embodied in a
285. See Roe, supra note 166, at 855-63. Failing to discharge significant liability, such
as environmental liability, can gut the effectiveness of a reorganization. The continued
existence of such liability can have numerous repercussions upon the reorganized debtor.
It can limit the debtor's access to credit by making financing costly, since a borrower with
significant liabilities is a bad risk. It may discourage investment, since investors will
worry that future dividends will be applied to pay off the debt. Consequently, the reorga-
nized debtor may choose to sell assets or forego new projects to increase cash. The debtor
may also participate in high risk strategies to assure shareholders some return on their
investment. Full discharge of all liabilities reduces the financial uncertainty that makes
the reorganized debtor appear to be a bad risk. Id. at 856-63.
Nevertheless, these outcomes, which were postulated in the context of the asbestos
bankruptcies, see generally id., presume that all the relevant parties can foresee that the
undischarged liability, like chickens, will eventually come home to roost. See, e.g., Kane
v. Johns Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that based upon
Manville's studies, the corporation anticipated that it would be named in over 100,000
personal injury suits arising out of their production of asbestos with a total potential
liability of $2 billion). Thus, the undischarged liability influences lending and investment
choices. In contrast, the debtor's pre-petition liability for CERCLA response costs at sites
that are undiscovered, or at discovered sites where the debtor has not yet been identified
as a PRP, cannot affect such decisions because it is unknown. In essence, liability for such
pre-petition claims is no different from liability which may arise out of the debtor's post-
petition conduct. Therefore, excepting such claims from discharge should not burden the
reorganized debtor any more than does the possibility that CERCLA liability might arise
from the debtor's post-confirmation conduct.
286. See supra note 230 at 3043-44.
287. See supra note 226.
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Record of Decision (ROD).288
Ideally, an estimation hearing could take place after completion of the
RI/FS. Waiting for issuance of the ROD could unduly delay the pro-
ceedings, while basing an estimation upon the preliminary assessment ap-
purtenant to listing on the NPL would not allow the EPA to investigate
the appropriate remedy for the conditions presented by the site. The
debtor should be required to facilitate the investigation by disclosing the
location of sites it has used for waste disposal, and the types of waste
disposed there. Again, the debtor will be motivated to cooperate to the
fullest extent possible in the RI/FS in order to facilitate maximum dis-
charge of response costs.
This solution, however, interferes with the primary goal of section
502(c)- to allow the court to estimate claims whose liquidation would
unduly delay confirmation.28 9 Any evidentiary standard requires that the
bankruptcy court wait for the EPA to investigate. A "fast track" investi-
gation procedure for newly discovered sites where the debtor has been
identified as a PRP might need to be introduced into CERCLA to guard
against inordinate delay of the bankruptcy process.
B. Amendments to CERCLA: Develop a Fast-Track Investigation
Procedure Applicable to Debtor-PRPs
Introducing an evidentiary standard into the estimation process, as
suggested above, places the entire bankruptcy proceeding at the mercy of
environmental agency procedure. The court must wait for the agency to
sufficiently investigate the claim before it can estimate it and proceed
with confirmation and closure of the bankruptcy case. For evidentiary
standards to be introduced into the estimation process without defeating
the entire purpose of that section of the Code, an expedited, or fast track,
investigation procedure is required. For such a procedure to work, how-
ever, the EPA must either discover or be notified that a debtor has filed
for bankruptcy Upon such discovery, the EPA must then have to expe-
dite investigation of the debtor's liability for those particular sites. While
such a procedure would shift liability determination from following
cleanup to preceding cleanup, in contravention of congressional intent,
290
288. Id.
289. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988); see generally notes 194-218 and accompanying
text. It is difficult to gauge the significance of this delay to the progress of Chapter 11
cases since, in the past decade, they have become notoriously slow and costly. See Mi-
chele Galen & Catherine Yang, A New Page for Chapter 11?, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 25, 1993,
at 36; see generally Phyllis Furman & Peter Grant, A Bankrupt Court, CRAIN'S NEW
YORK Bus., Apr. 5-11, 1993, at 1. While delaying estimation hearings to allow the EPA
to collect sufficient information concerning a particular site through a fast-track investi-
gation procedure might exacerbate this problem, increased efficiency in the handling of
other aspects of Chapter 11 cases could offset this effect. Furthermore, the benefits of
improved accuracy in the estimation of response costs must also deserve consideration.
290. The provision of CERCLA barring pre-enforcement review was specifically in-
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such a compromise is necessary if debtor-PRPs are to be prevented from
dodging liability for CERCLA response costs in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
As recognized by the Second Circuit in In re Chateaugay Corp.29
[i]f the Code, fairly construed, creates limits on the extent of environ-
mental cleanup efforts, the remedy is for Congress to make exceptions
to the Code to achieve other objectives that Congress chooses to reach,
rather than for courts to restrict the meaning of an across-the-board
legislation like a bankruptcy law in order to promote objectives evident
in more focused statutes.292
Congress must clarify the proper balance between CERCLA and the
Bankruptcy Code through specific provisions designed to resolve the con-
flicts between them. The primary conflict between the two statutes is pro-
cedural. As written, both statutes reflect congressional recogmtion that
delay of their respective procedures may defeat or substantially frustrate
each statute's entire purpose. The Code attempts to discharge all eligible
claims and, in a Chapter 11 case, facilitate the debtor's reorganization
without undue delay.2 93 CERCLA attempts to clean up toxic sites as
quickly and economically as possible without the interference of liability
determinations.294 Reconciliation of the two statutes should preserve
their procedural integrity to the greatest possible extent. It should also
introduce the concept that, in its own way, CERCLA liability is a debt
which the party responsible for contamination owes to society. It should
not be discharged without adequate investigation and provision for its
payment. By making it harder to discharge CERCLA liability in Chapter
11, Congress not only will guarantee that the debtor bears more of its fair
share of response costs, but also will dispel the concept that the costs of
pollution are no more significant than ordinary consumer debts.
Kerry H. Mithalal
cluded to prevent such a reordering of EPA priorities. See supra notes 218-41 and accom-
panymg text.
All of the amendments proposed thus far contemplate that the EPA will frequently
have to litigate a debtor's liability as a PRP in an estimation hearing prior to completion
of the cleanup. This is de-facto pre-enforcement review. As discussed above, under the
language of section 9613 of CERCLA, an estimation hearing, which requires the EPA to
litigate the debtor's liability response costs of uncompleted remedies at sites, does not
constitute pre-enforcement review because it does not challenge a remedial or removal
action as defined by the statute. Therefore, technically, no amendment to the section
bamng pre-enforcement review need be made in connection with the amendments dis-
cussed above. However, Congress should acknowledge that forcing the EPA to litigate
the cost of site-specific remedies necessitates a determination of the debtor's liability as a
PRP, and thus constitutes de facto pre-enforcement review.
291. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
292. Id. at 1002.
293. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
294. See supra notes 215-41 and accompanying text.

